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ABSTRACT 
 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters is first and unique international legal instrument which consists of 
strictly procedural provisions in environmental matters. 
The institutional structure of Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters consists of a particular subsidiary body, namely Compliance Commitee, responsible to 
assess submissions of civil society regarding failure to comply with treaty provisions. 
Although Compliance Commitee issues unbindings findings and recommendations of the 
Parties to international legal instrument, currently the quasi-judicial practice of Compliance 
Commitee has gained recognition beyond scope of application of Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters in a broader transboundary context. 
In this thesis the influence of compliance mechanism under Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters will be studied. The most important factors which enables 
efficient implementation and application of environmental participatory rights within the framework 
of Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters and relevant framework of EU 
law will be determined and analysed. 
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SUMMARY 
 
The aim of Master Thesis “Compliance Mechanism under Aarhus Convention – Effective 
Legal Instrument for Enforcement of International Environmental Law” (thereafter –thesis) is to 
identify the role of compliance mechanism under Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters to adress issues of application and implementation of treaty based binding 
international commitments and to enhance coherent application of environmental participatory 
rights. 
The introduction of thesis will provide for a brief inside into the overall topic and the main 
research goals will be defined.  
The main body of substance of hesis will be divided into three chapters. 
In order to highlight historical background with regard to recognition environmental 
participatory rights and their linkages with the concept of compliance mechanism will be presented 
in the first chapter of Thesis. Developments of CJEU jurisprudence with respect of recognition of 
environmental participatory rights as well theoretical background on applied theories on compliance 
mechanisms also will be presented within first chapter of Thesis. 
The second chapter will be devoted to the assesment of implementation and application of 
environmental participatory rights as enshrined in Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters through findings and recommendations of Compliance Committee. 
Comparative assessment with respect to application of “three Aarhus pillars” will be applied in case 
studies of CJEU jurisprudence and quasi-judicial practice of Compliance Committee will also be 
provided within second chapter of Thesis. 
Lastly, in the third chapter of Thesis case study with regard to findings and recommendations 
of Compliance Committee in case ACCC/C/2008/32 in conjunction with relevant CJEU case-law 
will be provided. Legal assessment on various options including potential amendments to the EU 
legislation will also be provided in third chapter of Thesis. 
In the conclusion a summary of findings of Thesis will be provided. 
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INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Aarhus Regulation - Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and 
bodies 
CJEU – Court of Justice of the European Union 
EC – European Communities 
ECJ – European Court of Justice 
EIB – European Investment Bank 
Espoo Convention – UN Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context 
MOP – Meeting of the Parties 
NGO – Non-governmental organisation 
TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UN – United Nations 
VCLT - Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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INTRODUCTION 
On 17 March 2017 the Compliance Committee to the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (thereafter – Aarhus Convention)1 made a landmark 
decision by finalizing its findings and recommendations regarding non-compliance with Article 9, 
paragraph 3 and 4 by the EU in case ACCC/C/2008/32. The ongoing case ACCC/C/2008/32 since 1 
December 2008 brought before Compliance Committee by a NGO ClientEarth (thereafter - the 
communicant) and supported by the members of the public concerned alleged con-compliance by 
the EU on two grounds with regard to access to justice in environmental matters. Namely, judicial 
review of decisions of the EU institutions might not be brought directly before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union because of restrictive locus standi of NGOs and incompatibility of Article 
10 paragraph 1 of the Aarhus Regulation with Article 9, paragraph 3 of Aarhus Convention.  
In particular, cautious approach of Compliance Committee not to provide authoritative 
assessment on pending judicial proceedings before CJEU refrained to reach a conclusion on EU 
compliance with Article 9, paragraph 3 and 4 of Aarhus Convention by encouraging the EU 
judiciary to put forwards new approaches to the case-law to access to justice in environmental 
matters and urging all competent EU institutions to adopt measures for full enforcement of access to 
justice in environmental matters of any individual concerned. Based on EU judiciary of first 
instance progressive stance regarding access to justice by the general public in environmental 
matters Compliance Committee by assessing established case-law of CJEU on access to justice 
reached conclusion of EU non-compliance with Article 9, Paragraph 3 and 4 of Aarhus Convention. 
Not only conclusion of EU failure to comply with Article 9, Paragraph 3 and 4 of Aarhus 
Convention but also Compliance Committee’s quasi-judicial guidance on how compliance of the 
EU might be restored by issuing precise recommendations on legislative measures to be adopted 
and implemented to reach full compliance with treaty-based binding requirements of access to 
justice are of importance to analyze. Namely, whether NGO’s increased participation in various 
environmentally related international fora and their active contribution to oversee compliance and 
address non-compliance of parties to multilateral environmental agreements in fact, firstly fill the 
void of internationally negotiated and adopted legal instrument on protection of the environment 
and secondly whether exercise of their participatory rights in environmental matters contributes also 
for enforcement of substantial human rights. Based on the foregoing, the following research 
question is proposed – whether, and to what extent a compliance mechanism under the Convention 
provides effective enforcement of environmental participatory rights.  
The aim of this thesis therefore is to analyze and conduct research on the outcomes of 
compliance mechanism under Aarhus Convention through an examination of decisions of the 
Committee related to non-compliance. Particular attention will be given to the proceedings and 
outcomes of the compliance case ACCC/C/2008/32. The Master thesis is structured in three general 
sections. The first two sections serve as a basis to conclude the overall analysis in the last section in 
order to provide potential amendments to the EU legislation. Thus in the first section there will be 
analysis provided on general aspects of compliance mechanism with and its linkages with 
multilateral environmental agreements. In the second section analysis of so called Convention 
“three pillars” will be provided regarding recent developments in compliance cases of Compliance 
Committee. The third section will describe the development of the compliance case 
ACCC/C/2008/32 concerning EU and will assess scope of potential risks on setting up bad 
precedent of non-compliance and even jeopardizing effective enforcement of international 
                                                 
1
 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 25 June 1998), United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2161, p. 447., entered into force 30 
October 2001. Available on: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1998/06/19980625%2008-
35%20AM/Ch_XXVII_13p.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2020. 
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environmental law as well provide the way forward ensuring compliance by the EU. Legal 
assessment and analysis of various options including potential amendments to the EU legislation 
will be assessed in order to bring EU in full compliance. 
 
1. Evolution of International Environmental Law 
1.1. Origins/Recognition of procedural rights in environmental matters and their 
linkages with compliance mechanism 
The recognition of environmental law as a subject of international law is due to on one hand 
emergence of the functional necessity to address transboundary challenges related to environment 
and natural resource increased consumption, as well as to tackle air and water pollution, depletition 
of ozone layer, deforestation, desertification, loss of biodiversity and on the other to acknowledge 
nefast and irreversible impact of human activity in the 1960s and 1970s
2
. Although state-centric 
clarification of the nature of state obligation in transboundary context provide principle 21 of 1972 
Stockholm Declaration, it should be also emphasized that the United Nations’ Conference on the 
Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden was the very first global forum which recognized 
the rights to an adequate environment which encompasses the right to “freedom, equality and 
adequate conditions of live” of any individual and declared reciprocal duty for any individual “to 
protect and improve the environment for present and future generations”3.  
Interestingly though, ahead of venue of abovementioned international conference academia 
reflected on an establishment of guardians of nature by legal provisions aiming at representation of 
the environment. Using analogy it was argued that as legal representation is already established for 
certain socially vulnerable groups of public, the representation of “voiceless environment”4 should 
be protected equally by law. From a perspective of procedural rights it was also argued that NGOs 
should be provided with legal capacity to represent environmental interests thus considering NGOs 
technical and legal resources they might be best placed to determine and to bring to the attention of 
judiciary negative impact to the environment associated with particular territory.
5
 Official 
recognition of the environment as a subject of general international concern is among outcomes of 
the Stockholm Conference, in particular regarding principle 21 and 22 of Stockholm Declaration 
together with a an action plan constituted for global assessment of the environment of 200 
recommendations. In legal perspective the approach taken by the Stockholm conference to 
recognize importance for more coordinated and harmonious response to environmental challenges 
by adopting so called non-binding “soft-law” instruments have been criticized by some 
environmental rights scholars for not awarding strong enough normative value for international 
lawmaking in environmental matters. Such position cannot be supported because Stockholm 
Conference established also institutional framework under United Nations Environment Program to 
develop and strengthen environmental policies and law6 besides a formal treaty negotiating, 
                                                 
2
 Maria L. Banda, “Regime Congruence: Rethinking the Scope of State Responsibility for Transboundary 
Environmental Harm”, Minnesota Law Review, 1879 (April 25, 2019): 1895-1896. Available 
on: https://minnesotalawreview.org/article/regime-congruence-rethinking-the-scope-of-state-responsibility-for-
transboundary-environmental-harm/. Accessed on 9 March 2020. 
3
 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/4, at 2-65 (June 16, 1972). Available 
on: http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofMARPOL/Documents/A%20CONF.48
%2014%20Rev.1.pdf (also referred to as the “Stockholm Declaration”). Accessed on 9 March 2020. 
4
 Marjan Peeters, “About Silent Objects and Barking Watchdogs: The Role and Accountability of Environmental 
NGOs”, European Public Law 24, no. 3 (2018): p.452. 
5
 Christopher D. Stone, “Should Trees Have Standing-toward legal rights for natural objects”, Southern California Law 
Review 450 (1972): pp.450-501. 
6
 Marjan Peeters, “About Silent Objects and Barking Watchdogs: The Role and Accountability of Environmental 
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drafting and adopting process thus responding to “transformation in the valoration of environmental 
concerns in all levels of society”7.  
Legal scholars of international law are in general consent that constitution and importance of 
procedural rights in environmental matters were affirmed by adoption the United Nations Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (thereafter – Rio Declaration) within the United 
Nations’ Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. Importance of full participation of 
all concerned individuals is emphasized as a prerequisite to respond most efficiently to 
environmental challenges. Principle 10 of Rio Declaration defines scope and legal architecture for 
procedural rights in environmental matters also called participatory rights insofar it recognized any 
individual’s access to information in environmental matters and opportunity to participate in 
decision-making processes
8
. Apart from stressed necessity to grant any individual access to justice 
and administrative review procedures Principle 10 of Rio Declaration does not provide equal 
recognition for civil society to access to justice, information and participation in decision-making. 
Although recognition of the general public to be consulted, heard and included in decision-making 
is not included expresis verbis, the European Coal and Steel Community already in 1957 were 
under obligation within its institutional framework to cooperate with “parties concerned”9. 
Therefore Consultative Commitee and nowadays European Economic and Social Commitee role 
was not only to serve in its capacity to consult and be consulted by the High Authority but also to 
create itself a balanced fora consisting of representatives of industries and labour representatives. 
Committee of the Regions established by the Treaty of European Union
10
 (Maastricht Treaty) also 
reflected incentives of newly-founded economic and regional organisation to encourage by 
representatives of regional and local bodies to participate implicitly in decision-making. Involment 
of the social partners representing industries and labour were first affirmed by the Protocol on 
Social Policy to the Maastricht Treaty and later all EU and its Member States legally binding 
regulatory framework were included in the Treaty of Amsterdam
11
. Regarding environmental 
regulation legal scholars assumes that as early as 1985 Environmental Impact Directive was first 
legal instrument containing mostly procedural rquirements and providing general public rights to 
participate in transborder environmental decision-making.
12
Rising awareness and so called upgrade 
of environmental impact assessment procedural rights was ensured by the ratification of Espoo 
Convention by EC whereas Article 2 Paragraph 6 requires signatory Party to provide opportunities 
to the general public to participate in environmental impact assesment procedures.
13
 Adoption by 
the Council of Directive 90/313 on access to environmental information is described by legal 
scholars as “another milestone in community legislation that addresses “environmental rights””14.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
NGOs’”, European Public Law 24, no. 3 (2018); p.453. 
7
Luis E.Rodriguez-Rivera, “Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under International Law? It depends on 
the Source”, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, no.12 (2001). 
8
 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develeopment, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (12 
August 1992). Available 
on: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_CONF.151
_26_Vol.I_Declaration.pdf .Accessed 9 March 2020. 
9
 Treaty Establishing The European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, in force 23 July 1952). Available on: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11951K:EN:PDF . 
10
 Supra note 8, Article 4 Paragraph 2. 
11
 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
and certain related acts, Articles 118., 118a, 118b, 118c; OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, p. 1–144 
12
 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment, OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, p. 40–48.; Richard Macrory and Sharon Turner, “Participatory Rights, 
Transboundary Environmental Governance and EC Law”, Common Market Law Review, no. 39 (2002): p.498. 
13 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention) (Espoo, 25 
February 1991) 1989 UNTS 309 157 Available 
on: https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/Espoo_Convention_authentic_ENG.pdf. 
Accessed: 6 April, 2020 
14
 Jerzy Jendroska, “Aarhus Convention and Community Law: the Interplay’”, European Environmental and Planning 
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However, it should be also emphasized that abovementioned EC secondary legislation were 
mostly accentuated by any public authority of Member States binding and defined obligations on 
how information relating to the environment should be disseminated. The requirements although 
lacking a reference to an active dissemination of environmentally related information contained 
precise and clear requirements regarding actions authorities are upon obligation to observe, for 
instance, dissemination of information relating to environment upon request of individuals should 
had been provided without a constraint to justify their legitimate interests. In addition, such 
generally acknowledged nowadays environmental participatory rights as access to justice and its 
related issues of prohibatory expensive court costs were also invoked in the scope of application, 
however the wording of the requirements confered to Members States at that time a large marge of 
appreciation on how to introduce and apply review mechanisms for inssuficient dissemination of 
information to individuals in environmental matters.
15
 
1.2. Approach of Court of Justice of the European Union towards recognition of 
participatory rights  
Steady emergence of transboundary participatory rights were facilitated also by the jurispridence of 
the Court of Justice regarding conferral of rights on individuals in matters of environmental 
protection. The ECJ in case Commission v. Germany (C-131/88) found the Member State in non-
compliance of its obligation to adopt and apply sufficiently clear and precise measures in order a 
secondary legislation of EC to be implemented into German legal system. The ECJ also ephasized 
the necessity measures of transposition to be clear and precise thus enabling individuals to enforce 
them fully and also rely on them before national judiciary.
16
 In case Comission v. Germany (C-
361/88) ECJ reaffirmed its previous jurisprudence regarding the Member State by establishing a 
mandatory approach to interpret environmental legislation as creating rights and obligations for 
individuals if its main purpose is to protect human health and environment.
17
 It might be assumed 
that at an early age of construction of the EU despite the lack of generalization approach to include 
a broad range of interest groups besides consultative bodies comprised of representatives of 
industries and regional entities were promising. EU strategy to expand gradually inclusion of 
sectoral representatives of general public and to enforce new commitments regarding participatory 
rights in environmental matters was an assertion for EU to become a driving force in environmental 
matters.  
A clear manifestation within EU integration proceedings to recognize participatory democracy 
and participation itself “as a value or a founding principle of the Union”18 was introduced by Article 
11 TFEU. Article 11 TFEU prescribes mandatory provision for any institiution on EU or Member 
States’level to include citizens and their organisations for public consultations. Interestingly though 
procedural mechanisms aiming at enhancing access to justice, public participation in decision-
making and access to information in environmental matters were formalized and introduced in EC 
legal system with EC signature of UN Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (Aarhus Convention) in 1998 and its 15 Member States. According to legal scholars the 
greatest legal value of the multilateral environmental agrement among others is being “the first 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Law 12, (2005): p.13 
15
 Council Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the environment, O.J. L 
158,23.6. 1990, p. 56-58; Articles 3, 4,5. 
16
 Judgment of 28 February 1991, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, C-
131/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:87, paragraph 61. 
17
 Judgment of 30 May 1991, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, C-361/88, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:224, paragraph 15. 
18
 Jane Rachel and Agnes Hellner, “EU Participatory Democracy from Promise to Practice:the Role of IOs and NGOs”, 
Scandinavian Studies in Law 62, (2016): p.200. 
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binding international instruments that attempts to address, comprehensively and exclusively, the 
issues of citizens’environmental rights”19.  
Obligations arising under Aaarhus Convention which are framed in so-called “Aarhus pillars”, 
namely, access to information (Article 4 and 5), public participation in decision making (Article, 6, 
7 and 8) and access to justice (Article 9). Among distinction of shared and exclusive competence 
conferred to EU solely or in mixed proportions with its Member States in accordance with Article 2 
TFEU competence in environmental matters to adopt EU legislation is shared with its Member 
States
20
. Therefore regarding environmental matters EU by exercising conferred rights in 
accordance with Article 216 TFEU might enter into international agreements which have 
consequently binding legal effect on EU institutions and on its Member States. The extent of 
protection and effective application without grounded restrictions of environmental procedural 
rights provided for individuals and civil society under Aarhus Convention should be assessed in 
terms of EU compliance with public international law.  
Also it should be emphasized that EU ongoing proceedings and issues settled under Aarhus 
Convention compliance mechanism have arised from somehow ambigous perceptions and 
interpretations of a relationship between secondary law, international treaties and customary 
international law. The prevalence of EC legal order over national legal systems of EC Member 
States was affirmed in case van Gend&Loos (C-26/62).
21
 consequently in case Costa v. Enel (C-
6/64)
22
 the supremacy of EC law was established by ECJ. The ECJ in case AETER (C-22/70)
23
 
assessed the question of capacity of EC to act in interntional matters regardless of vested rights by 
the primary EC law. The ECJ asserted EC competence to act internationally as it sees fit even in a 
case of absence of expressly recognized competence to negotiate and conclude agreements with 
third countries beyond conferred power by the primary source of law. The fact that international 
requirements which stem from binding international agreements constitutes an integral part of EC 
legislation was confirmed in case Haegeman v. Belgium (C-181/73)
24
. It is worth to note ECJ 
however did not developed legal reasoning on how it came to a such conclusion and somehow 
avoided to provide an assessment on interaction which might have had taken place between an 
application of supremacy of EC law and place in the hierarchy of norms of concluded international 
agreements. ECJ in case Kupferberg (C-104/81)
25
 in declarative terms rather than in extended 
argumentative approach presumably relying on its jurispridence regarding EC capacity to act in 
international matters established that international commitments taken on behalf of EC and its 
Member States should be enforced in full compliance. ECJ also reaffirmed in a broader context its 
competence to supervise and enforce uniform application of EC law insofar measures to be adopted 
to implement international commitments should be aligned in content with EC law in force. 
Following the rationale of uniform application Member States’ ECJ also hold that international 
commitments should be applied and enforced in accordance with EC legal framework. In absence to 
initiate a discussion on hierarchy of norms ECJ provided a certain clarification using analogy in 
case Commission v. Germany (C-61/94) stating that insofar EC secondary legislation should be 
interpreted in accordance with EC primary law those provisions of EC secondary law which shares 
scope of application similar to EC international commitments should also be interpreted 
                                                 
19
 Supra note 14.;p.12. 
20
 Supra note 8, Article 2 
21
 Judgment of 5 February 1963, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend&Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration, C-26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
22
 Judgment of 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, p.593 
23
 Judgment of 31 March 1971, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities, C-
22/70, ECLI:EU:C:1971:32, p.264 
24
 Judgment of 30 April 1974, R.&V.Haegeman v Belgian State, C-181/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:41, paragraph 5. 
25
Judgment of 26 October 1982, Hauptzollamnt Mainz v C.A. Kupferber&Cie KG a.A., C-104/81, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:362, paragraphs 11 and 12. 
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consistently with those international obligations.
26
  
Although findings of ECJ clarified a mechanism for an international requirement to be 
interpreted, introduced and applied within EC law, ECJ remained silent regarding discussion on a 
statuss of public international law within EC legal framework. Unfortunately huge hopes on two 
cases before ECJ in 2008 Intertanko (C-308/06) and Kadi (C-0402/05 P) did not resulted in 
obtained outcome on ECJ’s clear guidance what effects should be given to binding international 
norms in the framework of EC law. In Intertanko-case although relying on its well-established law-
case ECJ reaffirmed binding force of EC concluded international agreements and their supremacy 
over secondary EC law. However, it should be noted that ECJ provided a narrow interpretation 
regarding mandatory requirements a measure of secondary EC law should comply to in order to be 
valid. ECJ concluded that a validity check of EC secondary legislation to be compatible with EC 
binding international commitments encompasses two conditions. Namely, in accordance with well-
established case-law international commitment should have binding force upon EC and a contain of 
international provision should be precise and unconditional thus judicial conclusions were reached 
on hierarchy of norms regarding ranking between international provisions and EC law whereas EC 
judiciary remained silent on hierarchy of norms arising out of international agreements and EC 
primary law.
27
  
In the ruling of Kadi-case ECJ summerized EC commitment to apply a conformity review of 
EC legislation based on the rule of law and recognition of fundamental rights being an integral part 
of general principles of law. In the meantime ECJ in accordance of well-estalished case law 
ephasized importance of EC primary law with advanced assertion that it constitutes effective system 
of legal remedies and procedures. Also it should be noted that ECJ assessed with great care 
interlinkages of EC primary law with protection of fundamental rights. With regard to interpretation 
of international agreements ECJ took a strong stance establishing that the autonomy of EC legal 
system cannot be affected by international agreement. Therefore ECJ concluded that international 
agreement should not constitute negating direct effect to constitutional principles enrishined in EC 
primary law.
28
 Following the well-established case-law by ECJ on EU competence to act in 
international matters, its rights and obligations arising from international commitments, its various 
sectoral secondary legislation in environmental matters it might be argued that EU currently does 
not encounter deficiencies of compliance when environmental procedural rights are applied and 
enforced. Also it might be argued that in accordance with conclusions of ECJ in case Comission v. 
Ireland (C-459/03) legal framework to enjoy environmental procedural rights is being constituted in 
compliance with international commitments and EU legal order. ECJ confirmed mixed agreement 
equal status to sole EC concluded international agreement which consequently constitutes an 
integral part of EC law thus ECJ by conferral of EC primary law has juridiction to settle disputes 
regarding its correct application and interpretation as well as to assess Member State’s 
compliance
29
.  
The issue of EU institutions’ compliance under Aarhus Convention remains though 
unresolved insofar NGOs are restricted to have access to EU judicial institutions to challenge 
decisions, acts and omissions by EU institutions. In addition, it is worth to note existance of 
extensive case-law of ECJ [CJEU] assesing any EU Member State performance based EU law 
induced obligation to comply with treaty based obligations which stems from EU secondary law. 
Legal scholars have noted that Aarhus Convention treaty terms are interpreted by three structures of 
                                                 
26
 Judgment of 10 September 1996, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, C-
61/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:313, paragraph 52. 
27
 Judgment of 3 June 2008, The Queen,on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
(Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport, C-308/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312, paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45 
28
 Judgment of 18 July 2013, European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, C-
595/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 22. 
29
 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Commission of the European Communities v Ireland, C-459/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, 
paragraphs 82, 84 and 85. 
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governance, namely, national administrative authorities and judiciary, ECJ and Compliance 
Committee. Also it should be noted that not only MOP have a major role in interpreting treaty 
provisions but also facilitating compliance of the Parties under Aarhus Convention. Therefore it is 
worth to note that while ECJ long before EU became a Party to Aarhus Convention established 
direct effect of legally binding international commitment with a third country if taken conjointly its 
wording and purpose the provision refers to clear and precise obligation which might be brought 
before national judiciary, it’s established case-law reflects on huge challenges NGOs are faced with. 
Legal standing and direct access of NGOs to EU judicial institutions are denied in most cases 
without assessment if NGO might be addmitted as a party in a case. In addition, legal scholars have 
observed that constitution of nowadays effective compliance mechanism under Aarhus Convention 
took place “out of the relatively weak provisions of the Convention” and it is by consensual 
decision of COP that compliance mechanism to monitor Parties commitments was introduced. 
Additionally with reference to assumed extended discretionary power of Parties to vary approaches 
on how provisions of Aarhus Convention are being implemented, it might be argued that instead of 
submittions with requests to provide guidance on how particular treaty provision should be 
interpreted and implemented at national level civil society predominantly constituted by NGOs will 
submit communications claiming Parties’ administrative and judicial procedures non-compliance 
with Aarhus three pillars. The conclusions of compliance-case ACCC/C/2008/32 initiated more than 
ten years ago and still pending under approval in the future by MOP is affirmative in this regard. 
1.3. Measuring compliance – theoretical background 
Legal scholars have asserted that a treaty is “the most formal and reliable international 
commitment” based on twofold assumption that “treaties represent clear and weell-defined of states; 
treaties can provide explicit dispute resolution” and “treaties define rules for accession to and exit 
from their terms”30. Also a treaty constitutes a contract among contracting parties because States 
tend to “agree to an elevated level of commitment in a treaty to obtain an elevated level of 
commitment from others”31. Article 18 of VCLT implies equal importance of any international 
treaty provided that any is legally binding
32
. Furthermore, with regard to applicable provisions on 
treaty interpretation VCLT provides that treaty interpretation must be enforced in conformity with 
“any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions” as well as “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”33.  
Additionally, general assumption should be made that upon approval of provisions of Aarhus 
Convention any contracting party was well-aware of its preparedness of national legal system with 
intention to commit to the commonly agreed obligations and to reach the objectives of the 
agreements as fully and as promptly as possible. Also it is important to note the EU whilst 
becoming a contracting Party to Aarhus Convention asserted unilaterally that “institutions will 
apply the Convention within the framework of their existing and future rules on access to 
documents and other relevant rules of Community law in the field covered by the Convention” and 
it has already adopted several legal instruments, binding on its Member States, implementing 
provisions of this Convention”34 and also that the Community [EU] bears responsibility “for the 
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performance of those obligations resulting from the Convention which are covered by Community 
law in force”35. This leads to an assumption that given distinct legal order of the EU based of well-
established case law of ECJ [CJEU] and repartition of obligations with Member States invoked 
unilaterally to enforce treaty requirements under Aarhus Convention the EU took strong confident 
stance as to correct enforcement of environmental law up to date and willingness to adopt and apply 
supplementary measures for improving application of environmental law. It suffices here to note 
that although recognition to guarantee environmental participatory rights for NGOs and public in 
general within EU institutions was a positive incentive in theory, shortcomings in compliance with 
provisions regarding NGOs’ legal standing before EU judicial institutions diminish not only their 
capacity of “being legitimate representative of the environment and of environmental interests”36 
but also the concept of participatory democracy which is not endorsed to the fullest extent possible 
due to incapacity of NGOs “to strenghthen the environmental perspective in law-making”37. 
A meaningful step in the process of acknowlegment of EU non-compliance of Aarhus 
Convention to ensure its own institutions’ compliance would be to assess how EU interacts with 
other Parties of the treaty, what are legal arguments and grounds advanced by EU to interpret the 
treaty provision of question and what are the outcomes, namely, amended provision or 
administrative practice to be applied in order to commit to adequate compliance. Professor Koh has 
advanced theory based on asserted incompletness of two brunches of a coherent group of general 
propositions explaining why nations comply with international law also known as compliance 
continuum
38
. Professor Koh is not persuded by approach of managerial school advanced by 
Professors Chayes and by Thomas Franck’s fairness theory39. The criticism of the “Chayesian 
approach” comes from the lack of grounded course of action how procedurally international 
provision either “procedural, such as a requirement to report” or “substantive, such as an 
undertaking to control an activity”40 is being accepted, applied and enforced.  
In accordance with managerial school legal provisions are “prescriptions for action in 
situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a sense that they ought to be followed” and 
“management tools, such as transparency, reporting, verification and monitoring, dispute resolution, 
and capacity building are the key to designing a compliance regime to encourage compliance”41. 
Regarding factors that initiate non-compliance the managerial school distinguishes three: ambigious 
terms setting-up obligations, lack of capacity to enforce obligation and change in circumstances
42
. 
Managerial school also identifies approach to be adopted for maintaining treaty compliance and it is 
“an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider 
public.”43 
Professor Koh have also expressed scepticism towards “fairness theory” by Thomas Franck. 
Fairness theory is based on an assumption that if the law is considered to be fair compliance will be 
reached. Fairness is characterized as substantive and procedural. Substantive fairness is related to 
equity of distributive justice whereby notion of distributative justice has gained wide acceptance in 
the international fora due to challenges faced with resource scarsity
44
. Legitimacy is a procedural 
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component which relates to “that attribute of a rule which conduces to the belief that it is fair 
because it was made and is applied in accordance with “right process””45. Five indicators under 
fairness theory are applied to measure right process or legitimacy such as “clarity of the rule”, “cues 
that constitutes authority”, “treating like cases alike and relating in a principled fashion to other 
rules of the same system” and conformity with interntional community’s procedural and 
institutional framework”46. An important aspect is that Thomas Franck has developed partially 
fairness theory based on analysis of processes and outcomes of other multilateral enviromental 
agreements asserting that “legitimate and legitimating regimes” are being created due to 
acknowledgment of restricted capacity of developing countries to deliver on their international 
commitments.
47
 
It seems justified to assume that compliance-mechanism under Aarhus Convention in fact 
encourages in accordance with fairness theory perception that the environmental participatory rights 
for NGOs and public in general are fair thus there is expectations for hight level of conformity. 
Article 15 of Aarhus Convention relates to obligation of the Parties to constitute by consent “non-
confrontational, non-judicial and consultative”48 mechanism for review of compliance whereby 
rights of public in general to refer directly to this mechanism as well as to submit comunications 
related to three Aarhus pillars are granted. The compliance-mechanism operates under the principle 
“members of the public have the right to make complaints to an independent and impartial 
committee at international level”49 including a novelty to submit a claim against a state before 
Compliance Commitee. However, it should be emphasized that due to specifity of the composition 
of Compliance Commitee’s nine elected members and their serving as independent experts in 
personal capacity Compliance Commitee does not exercise functions of the court of justice
50
.  
Furthermore, as by consensual agreement of the MOP nomination of elected members is 
extended also to nominees of envrionmental NGOs it might be assumed that it strenghtens 
legitimacy of environmental NGOs to be recognized as a legitimate representative of the 
environment. In addition, a compliance mechanism under Aarhus Convention is a body of 
procedures aiming to promote compliance or under terms of Aarhus Convention “to review 
compliance”51. Compliance mechanism under Aarhus Convention is designed by treaty based 
institutional arrangement, namely, Compliance Commitee whereby it is tasked to review 
compliance under five so far in practice identified circumstances as follows: when a Party exercise 
its right to submit non-compliance claim by another party; when a Party on its own initiative 
submits communications with regard to its own compliance; upon referral of the Secretariat to the 
Convention; in response to communications made by public with regard to Party’s compliance and 
upon of request of MOP to examine Party’s compliance with provisions of Aarhus Convention52.  
From the preceding summary of main features of fairness theory it might be assumed that 
established institutionalized multilateral arrangements for review of compliance, clear, plain and 
simple avenues to assess and to respond to non-compliance and obligations for the Parties to report 
on performance of Aarhus Convention enhances obedience of binding multilateral commitment. If 
                                                 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid., p.484 
47
 Supra note 39, p.485. 
48
 Supra note 34, Article 15. 
49 Attila Pánovics “Case ACCC/C2008/32 and Non-compliance of the EU with the Aarhus Convention”, Pécs Journal 
of International and European Law, (2017/II):p.7. 
50
 Supra note 34, Article 15 Paragraph 5 and 7; Article 4 of Annex to Decision 1/7 (adopted at MOP1, 2002); 
ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8. Available 
on: https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf . Accessed 18 May 2020. 
51
 Supra note 34, Article 15 
52
 Guide to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (adopted at the Committee’s 63rd meeting, Geneva, 11 - 15 
March 2019): p.23. Available 
on: https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/CC_Guidance/Guide_to_the_Aarhus_Convention_Com
pliance_Committee__2019.pdf . Accessed 18 May 2020. 
15 
 
Parties under Aarhus Convention are persuaded that compliance-mechanism in restictive terms and 
compliance-review in a broader context are applied non-discriminatory and in transparence it might 
be concluded that with regard to compliance-mechanism under Aarhus Convention the main 
features of fairness theory provides an explanation why Parties tend to comply.  
Managerial thought relies on a different approach regarding various obligations to report. A 
general assumption under managerial school regarding reporting is that obligations help to avoid 
conflicts and provide for transparent assessment of compliance is supported by advanced theory that 
“states tend to complywith agreements they have explicitly commited to, and breaches occur 
because of lack of resources rather than lack of will”53 . Under managerial school another important 
procedural incentive to enhance compliance is compliance monitoring procedures. It is worth to 
note that Parties to Aarhus Convention by common intent and based on overall objective to promote 
uniform application of participatory environmental rights in fact have constituted with nearly 
perfection non-adversary and non-confrontational compliance mechanism whereby anyone from the 
public in environmental matters have access to submit requests for treaty interpretation and review 
of compliance in accordance with a set of procedural rules which themselves are being adopted in 
nearly ordinary legislative procedure.  
As well-established quasi-judicial practice of Compliance Commitee under Aarhus 
Convention helps to promote outreach within contracting Parties and environmental NGOs to 
encourage civil society to participate as observers in law-making in area of access to information, 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice, advanced theory by Harold Koh 
provides further thought and consideration why extensive inclusion of general public strenghtens 
compliance under multilateral environmental agreements. Additionally and equally importantly, 
theory of Harold Koh and managerial school are in agreement with an assumption that “when a 
certain level of openess and transparency has been attained, the diplomatic ties between states, 
pressure from non-governmental organizations and the awareness of public are likely to keep 
complying with treaties”54.  
Having regard to aforementioned the main reasons why Parties comply with provisions of 
multilateral environmental treaty which has exclusively recognized environmental participatory 
rights might be found in managerial theory, in the fairness theory and in the theory advanced by 
Harold Koh. In case of increased risks for a contracting Party to favour breach of Aarhus provision 
rather to comply with its international commitments the main features of abovementioned theories 
provide guidance what measures should be implemented and followed to erase circumstances which 
lead to treaty-violating conduct. 
Section: 2. Legal appraisal and recent developments of Aarhus pillars 
2.1. Access to information 
Access to information is one of the cornerstones under Aarhus Convention which also was 
emphasized unilaterally by EU as an area of regulation in which conformity with treaty provisions 
has been established
55
. As early as in 1998 ECJ were requested to provide an interpretation of the 
term “information relating to the environment”. ECJ in case Mecklenburg hold that scope of 
application of Article 2(a) of the EU secondary legislation
56
 extends to acts “capable of adversely 
affecting or protecting the state of one of the sectors of the environment covered by the directive”57. 
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In addition, ECJ in case Mecklenburg followed Advocate General La Pergola line of reasoning on 
the intent of EC legislator not to provide precise definition of information relating to the 
environment because of nefast effects restrictive interpretation and application of precise definition 
might cause
58
. The second time before accession of EU to Aarhus Convention ECJ was requested to 
provide interpretation on what constitutes information relating to the environment concerned 
adjudication of infringment procedure against EU Member State. The ECJ in case Commission v. 
France maintained consistent line of interpretation with case Mecklenburg holding that information 
relating to the environment “relates either to the state of the environment or to activities or measures 
which could affect it, or to activities or measures intended to protect the environment, without the 
list in that provision including any indication such as to restrict its scope”59 and also asserting that 
legal relevance cannot be afforded to condition whether document in question issuing institution 
carries out a public service. It is reasonable to conclude that although some of legal scholars already 
within provisions of Aarhus Convention have criticized lack of precise definition of such terms as 
“environment”and “environmental”, a consistent interpretation by ECJ of term “information 
relating to the environment” in ECJ cases resolved problem of attempted narrow interpretation of 
environmental information and implicitly incoherent transposition of secondary EU law in legal 
systems of Member States which might have led to possible restrictions on access to information in 
environmental matters.
60
 
Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Aarhus Convention constitutes its first pillar, namely access to 
information. In accordance with Article 3 any Party to Aarhus Convention is under obligation to 
adopt and enforce appropriate measures in order to grant and facilitate effective access to 
information as well as it might adopt more stringent provisions referring to broader access to 
information. Article 4 and 5 refers to Party’s obligation for enforcement of access to environmental 
information held by or for public authorities and characterizes specific requirements for collection, 
maintenance or dissemination of environmental information. 
ECJ in case Ville de Lyon acknowledged within accession to Aarhus Convention EU binding 
obligation “to ensure, within the scope of EU law, a general principle of access to environmental 
information held by the public authorities”61. Additionally, it was clarified by ECJ that EU 
legislator aiming to implement the general principle of access to environmental information adopted 
Directive 2003/4/EC thus ensuring any natural or legal person in a Member State of the EU 
environmental participatory rights arising from one of the Aarhus pillars.
62
 Referring to well-
established case-law with regard to application of a general principle of access to environmental 
information held by or for public authorities ECJ in case Fish Legal and Shirley asserted importance of 
uniform interpretation of Directive 2003/4/EC in conformity with wording and aim of the Aarhus 
Convention. However, ECJ took a restrictive approach with regard to binding force of Aarhus 
Convention Implementation Guide drawing parallels with other explanatory documents which 
undoubtfully having legal significance provide for mere interpretation of international commitments 
without producing normative effect
63
. 
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Having regard to the aforementioned and considering the current status and implications of findings 
and recommendations of the Compliance Commitee under Aarhus Convention it might be argued 
that when considering how to hold Party concerned accountable for non-compliance with 
environmental participatory right of access to information the compliance-mechanism suggests 
being institutionally and substentially best placed to assess advanced questions of concern. 
 
2.1.1. Disclosure of information held by the Union’s Institutions and Bodies 
The Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention was requested in case 
ACCC/C/2007/21 to pronounce on EIB conduct whether non-disclosure of NGO’s request of 
information were in compliance under Aarhus Convention. The communicant argued that EIB 
among other treaty based commitments had breached Article 4 of the Aarhus Convention by not 
providing in two occasions requested environmental information the Party concerned were in 
posession of
64
. The argument put forwards by the Party concerned to clarify grounds for refusal to 
disclose requested information by NGO concerned assumption that documents were confidential 
and that “almost none of the finance contract constitutes environmental information in the sense of 
the Convention”65. While not finding EC to be strictly in non-compliance with Aarhus Convention, 
the Compliance Committee concluded that it might consider reaching a finding of non-compliance 
with Article 4 if erroneous application and encountered shortcomings of handling of information 
requests cannot be submitted for available review procedures
66
. The Compliance Committee also 
clarified approach on interpretation of the definition of “environmental information” by rejecting its 
narrow interpretation and establishing with regard to particular compliance case that “if a financing 
agreement deals with specific measures concerning the environment, such as the protection of a 
natural site, it is to be seen as containing environmental information”67. Interestingly though, the 
Compliance Commitee found also useful to make some general observations relating to filing an 
information request. Relying on factual description of the case whereby environmental information 
request did not made explicit references to public authority to provide an environmental 
information, the Compliance Committee concluded that better implementation of procedural 
provisions would be achieved if information request encompassed indications to Aarhus 
Convention, implementing national legislation or reference to environmental information in 
general
68
. This case seems to assume that Compliance Committee is not only willing to investigate 
and to issue findings and recommendations in alleged non-compliance cases but also to prevent 
incorrect application of Aarhus Convention by issuing interpretative guidelines on conduct of the 
public of identified non-compliance. 
Alongside with a paramount obligation of public authorities to ensure the widest possible 
availability and dissemination of the environmental information under Aarhus Convention the case-
law of ECJ appears to acknowledge the intent of EU legislator within the scope of two seperate 
legal regimes, namely, general access to information regime and access to environmental 
information regime “to give the fullest possible effect to the right of public access to documents of 
the institutions” and “to ensure the widest possible systematic availability and dissemination of the 
environmental information held by the institutions and bodies of the European Union”69. In case 
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Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN Europe ECJ rejected European 
Comission’s argument that concept of “‘information [which] relates to emissions into the 
environment’”70 within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 6 Paragraph 1 of Regulation 
1367/2006/EC
71
 must be interpreted restrictively. Furthermore, it was asserted by European 
Commission that concept must be restricted to information relating to emissions emanating from 
industrial installations such as factories and power stations and the concept should only refer to 
information relating to actual emissions into the environment
72
. ECJ observed that restrictive 
interpretation should be applied to those exceptions which precludes a broad access to information 
held by EU institutions. In addition, ECJ through interpretation of Aarhus Convention and 
Regulation No 1367/2006 held that approach to restrict inclusion of the information under concept 
“information [which] relates to emissions into the environment’” if it emanates from certain 
industrial source does not have legal relevance
73. In regard to limit of the concept of ‘information 
[which] relates to emissions into the environment’ to actual emissions into the environment, ECJ 
stressed that “concept cannot be limited to information concerning emissions actually released into 
the environment”74 in order to reach final conclusion that “foreseeable emissions, under normal or 
realistic conditions of use, from the product in question, or from the substances which that product 
contains, into the environment are not hypothetical and are covered by the concept of ‘emissions 
into the environment’ within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 
1367/2006”75.  
It appears that a procedural right for the public to access to environmental information which 
is produced and held by EU institutions have gained certain recognition due to findings and 
recommendations of the Compliance Committee and well-established case-law of ECJ. Broad 
interpretation of access to environmental information and recognition of overriding public interest 
of disclosure of enviromental information relevant for the protection of the environment precludes 
to advance such summarised grounds for refusal to grant access to environmental information as 
follows: relevance of issuing authority of information, narrow interpretation of concepts referring to 
procedural rights and wording of provisions under Aarhus Convention and relevant EU legislation. 
 
2.1.2. Disclosure of Information held by EU Member States and other Parties 
The access to environmental information provisions in Article 4 and 5 of Aaarhus Convention 
refer to two separate approaches of disclosure of information. The obligations of the Parties to 
collect and disseminate environmental information are defined in Article 4 which implies also 
Parties capacity to respond to requests of environmental information requests, which constitutes the 
subject of Article 4. Provisions of Article 5 convey obligations on Parties for active disclosure of 
environmental information. In addition, Compliance Committee have observed that “while Article 4 
of the Convention obliges the Parties to ensure that public authorities make environmental 
information available, and sets out a number of procedural requirements to that end, there is no 
express requirement in Article 4 for a specific procedure to be followed when assessing whether 
requested information is environmental information”76. The implementation of first pillar of Aarhus 
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Convention by the EU is ensured in EU secondary legislation – Directive 2003/4/EC. It is worth to 
note the importance of the case law of the ECJ in developing and ensuring the uniform application 
of an obligation to disseminate actively environmental information. ECJ in case Stichting Natuur en 
Milieu among other questions under prejudicial proceedings were requested to clarify material 
scope of Article 2 of Directive 2003/4/EC whether an information in question qualifies as 
environmental information which subsequentely is a subject of disclosure of in accordance with EU 
secondary law and provisions of Aarhus Convention
77
. According to the ECJ the term 
“environmental information” refers to particular sector governing preparatory works (studies and 
reports) which constitutes outcomes of a procedure aiming at prevention of risks and hazards for 
humans, animals and the environment
78
. In her Opinion, Advocate General Kokott took the view 
that although Article 2 of Directive 2003/4/EC provides for broad definition of environmental 
information considering its linkages with relevant aspects of human life, “it only covers information 
on effects caused by elements of the environment, environmental factors or environment-related 
measures and activities”79. The ECJ did not follow proposed restricted approach of interpretation 
which arguably was substantiated with practical argument to prevent application of broad 
interpretation of concept “environmental information” which might had resulted in an obligation to 
disseminate large proportions of non-environmental information.  
In contrast, the Compliance Commitee in case ACCC/C/2013/93 was reluctant to establish the 
Party concerned non-compliance with article 4 of Aarhus Convention regarding disclosure of 
requested information which was necessary for communicant’s academic research purposes. The 
case before Compliance Committee can be summarised as follows. The communicant argued that 
by not giving access to information of legal assessment of draft national legislative acts which 
contains legal analyses rather than political statements and by not conducting proper assesment and 
not providing grounds for non-partial disclosure of requested information the Party had failed to 
comply with Article 4 of Aarhus Convention
80
. Furthermore,the communicant maintained that the 
Party concerned had breached Article 4 Paragraph 7 of Aarhus Convention by not providing 
grounds of refusal to disclose requested information
81
. Although findings of Compliance Commitee 
with regard to interpretation of treaty based exceptions for non-disclosure of environmental 
information provide much needed guidance on what constitutes “internal communications of public 
authorities”, the considerations offered of alleged non-compliance with first Aarhus pillar includes 
references to insufficient documentation and lack of evidence to support alleged non-compliance. 
Furthermore, Compliance Committee when addressing alleged non-compliance provided 
ambiguous arguments to substantiate grounds for findings that Party concerned are in compliance 
with obligations of access to information. For instance, instead of sumbitting requests of 
information ex officio within proceedings of the case and developing legal reasoning on alleged 
unfounded refusal to disclose requested information, the Compliance Committee concluded without 
proceeding to assessment of factual circumstances of the case that the benchmark of non-
compliance with Article 4 Paragraph 1 is evidence “that the public authorities routinely denied 
access to information, including assessments (legal, environmental, technical or otherwise), by 
referring to it as internal communication, thus denying access to assessments informing its internal 
decision-making relating to the environment”82.  
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The arguments of the Compliance Committee also call into question the clarity, transparency 
and consistency of administrative practice of public authorities of the Party concerned regarding 
disclosure of environmental information. It also worth to mention that prior to the findings of the 
case ACCC/C/2013/93 Compliance Committee in case ACCC/C/2012/69 regarding alleged non-
compliance of disclosure of environmental information observed that “[f]ailing to provide reasons 
for the refusal to provide the requested information in their response to the request significantly 
limits transparency and accountability in the way the Party concerned implements the Convention 
and is thus not in keeping with the spirit of the Convention”83. Even if it had been established 
formally that the Party concerned was in-compliance with treaty provisions a fair balance should 
had been strucked between the interests of individual to recieve requested information in complete 
or separating and disclosing part of the information without prejudice to its possible confidentiality 
and in the meantime securing public interest “to give a public authority’s officials the possibility to 
exchange views freely”84 thus outweighing the need for full disclosure. 
The Compliance Committee have also identified through its findings and recommendations 
applied practices which without apparent breach of access to information provisions is aimed to 
circumvent correct and effective enforcement of obligations related to dissemination of information. 
In case ACCC/C/2009/36 Compliance Committee stated that an omission to provide a reply to 
sumbissions from the public regarding requests of environmental information cannot be “considered 
as “tacit agreement”85 and therefore an acceptable legal methodology. The Compliance Committee 
also found that “the concept of “positive silence” cannot be applied in relation to access to 
information” emphasizing that “[t]he right to information can be fulfilled only if public authorities 
actively respond to the request and provide information within the time and form required.”86. In 
addition, the Compliance Committee observed that such administrative challenges as heavy 
workload does not constitute an exception under Aarhus Convention justifying decision not 
disseminate requested information, however such applied practices as “lack of any response at all to 
requests for information or providing it later than two months after the request”87 constitutes an 
ultimate breach of Article 4 Paragraph 7 of Aarhus Convention. 
The wording of Article 5 of Aarhus Convention stipulates not only obligation of active 
dissemination of environmental information but also imposes positive duty upon public authorities 
to establish and maintain practical arrangements for collection, maintenance and storage of updated 
information necessary for enforcement of delegated functions. In case ACCC/C/2010/54 
Compliance Committee reiterated Parties obligations “to ensure that each public authority possesses 
the environmental information which is relevant to its functions”88 and found a causal link between 
lack of regulatory framework relating to policy-making in environmental matters and incapacity of 
the Party concerned to disseminate requested information. Although in case ACCC/C/2012/68 
Compliance Committee established that given its mandate it cannot pronounce on accuracy of 
provided information in question, it observed that Article 5 of Aarhus Convention implies for public 
                                                 
83
 Aarhus Compliance Committee, Romania, ACCC/C/2012/69, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2015/10 4 dated 26 June 2015, 
paragraph 72. Available 
on: https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2008/pp/mop3/ece_mp_pp_2008_5_add_6_e.pdf . Accessed 
29 May 2020. 
84
 Supra, note 76; paragraph 71. 
85
 Aarhus Compliance Committee, Spain, ACCC/C/2009/36, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2010/4/Add.2 dated 18 June 2010, 
paragraph 57. Available 
on: https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2008/pp/mop3/ece_mp_pp_2008_5_add_6_e.pdf . Accessed 
29 May 2020. 
86
 Ibid. 
87 Ibid, paragraph 56. 
88
 Aarhus Compliance Committee, European Union, ACCC/C/2010/54, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2012/12 dated 29 June 2012, 
paragraph 90. Available 
on: https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2008/pp/mop3/ece_mp_pp_2008_5_add_6_e.pdf . Accessed 
29 May 2020. 
21 
 
authorities competent of policy-making in environmental matters to possess all relevant and updated 
information necessary for proper enforcement of delgated functions
89
. 
Having regard to aforementioned, although findings and recommendations of Compliance 
Committee illustrate consistent approach in cases of alleged non-compliance to restrain itself from 
interpretation of substantive environmental law of the Party concerned, Compliance Committee has 
responded with a due diligence to concerns expressed by the public including NGOs concerning 
obstacles incurred to exercise their rights to access to information. The Compliance Commitee have 
provided in multiple cases authorative guidance on the scope of obligation to disclose 
environmental information identifiyng with precision measures to be adopted for consistent 
application of provisions of Aarhus Convention and has successfully determined applied prohibitory 
practices within environmental participatory rights which lead mostly not only to non-compliance 
with treaty provisions but also suggests possible breaches of binding international commitments in 
other areas of environmental law. 
2.1.3. Grounds of refusal to provide requested environmental information 
The Compliance Committee’s findings provides fixed and well-defined legal interpretation of 
provisions which constitute exceptions from general principle that all environmental information 
should be accessible. Compliance Committee in case ACCC/C/2012/69 observed that presumption 
of disclosure of information requires its dissemination every time it is established that requested 
information is “environmental information” under Article 2 Paragraph 3 of Aarhus Convention90. In 
addition, the case law characterizes scope of allegations regarding refusal to disclose requested 
information and provides guidance on compliance issues associated with an active duty to 
disseminate information and a passive duty to provide information unless a provision of law 
specifically exempts it from disclosure. 
In case ACCC/C/2008/24 the Compliance Committee reiterated treaty based participatory 
right for the public to have access to information stating that Aarhus Convention requires public 
authorities in conformity with Article 4, Paragraph 1 and 2 to respond to requests of members of the 
public within time limit of one month which might be extended up to two months due to justified 
complexity of the information
91
. It is also worth to note that in this case the Compliance Committee 
also stressed that a refusal to provide requested environmental information should be justified as 
soon as possible and in written form
92
. In multiple cases dealing with an alleged refusal of 
environmental information by communicants Compliance Committee have ephasized importance to 
provide a refusal of a request in writing clarifying that “one of the purposes of the refusal in writing 
is to provide the basis for a member of the public to have access to justice under article 9, paragraph 
1, and to ensure that the applicants can do so on an “effective” and “timely” basis, as required by 
article 9, paragraph 4”93. According to findings of Compliance Committee “providing a statement 
of reasons under article 4, paragraph 7, not only helps the administration and the public to 
understand the Convention, but also provides higher administrative authorities and the court with a 
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better basis to assess whether the officials have correctly implemented the law”94, therefore it might 
be argued that legal certainty and due process of the proceedings for the Party concerned depends 
on correct application of the wording and meaning of strictly procedural provisions. In contrast, 
although findings of Compliance Committee illustrates applied uniform doctrinal approach that 
unless a provision under Aarhus Convention specifically exempts requested environmental 
information from disclosure, a refusal to disclose it in most cases leads to adopt findings on 
identified non-compliance with provisions on access to information in general and non-compliance 
with provisions on exceptions of non-disclosure of information in particular. 
Despite of Compliance Committees consistent practice to interpret restrictively extent to 
which exemptions from and exceptions to general principle of accessibility of environmental 
information might be found in conformity with provisions of Aarhus Convention thus justifying a 
refusal of its dissemination, in case ACCC/C/2009/38 Compliance Committee was requested to 
pronounce on alleged non-compliance case regarding governmental decisions to restrict the general 
public access to information on endangered animal species. The communicant invited Compliance 
Comittee to acknowledge that the Party concerned had breached provisions of Aarhus Convention 
regarding access to information refusing to disseminate information on the state of the environment 
held by public authority
95
. It further argued that unless the access to information regarding protected 
and endangered species of animals is restored, the Party concerned fails to comply with Aarhus 
Convention. It was, on one hand, claimed that the communicant had not been in capacity to exercise 
its rights as a member of the public to participate in the proceedings of further decision making 
regarding adopted measures of public authority for the protection of endangered species, and on the 
other hand, the refusal to provide information on particualar endangered species had led to non-
compliance with Article 5 Paragraph 2(c) of Aarhus Convention which obliges a duty of active 
dissemination of information in the event to imminent threat to the environment thus enabling the 
public to adopt an approach to prevent or mitigate harm of the threat.
96
  
Compliance Committee observed that if requested information had fallen under exceptions of 
disclosure of information provided in Article 4 Paragraph 4(h) with regard to “breeding sites of rare 
species” the grounds for a refusal to disseminate it should have been interpreted in a restrictive way 
therefore the communicant might have had access to them. Furthermore, it maintained that 
disclosure of requested information would lead to obligation to disclose information to other 
members of the public upon request thus widening access to information on locations of breedings 
sites of protected and endangered species. Considering communicant to be trustworthy to grant 
access to information on locations of protected and endangered species, Compliance Committee 
also estabished that risks for widely accessible environmental information on breeding sites of rare 
endangered species might create adverse effects to the state of environment therefore prevention of 
identified threat to natural habitats outweighs applied restriction on communicant’s exercise of 
environmental participatory rights – access to information and public participation in decision-
making implicitly.
97
 
The findings of Compliance Commitee have also contributed on identification of prohibitory 
practices and development of interpretation of provisions under Aarhus Convention regarding 
accessibility of environmental information. As already indicated, the grounds in conformity with 
Article 4 Paragraph 3 and 4 justifying a refusal to disclose information are subject to restrictive 
interpretation therefore Compliance Commitee have established further guidance on the application 
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of treaty based exemptions which are brought to the attention as applied procedural deficiences by 
Party concerned causing allegations of non-compliance. In case ACCC/C/2010/51 Compliance 
Committee in response to claims brought by communicat of unjustified refusal to disclose 
environmental information and direct applicability of Article 4 Paragraph 6 of Aarhus Convention 
due to lack of proper legal framework of the Party concerned, observed that Article 4 Paragraph 
3(c) conveys rights to public authorities to “refuse to grant access to material which is in the course 
of completion only if this exemption is provided under national law or customary practice
98”. The 
Compliance Commitee again noted that as a principle of law exemptions are to be interpreted 
restrictively” taking into account “the public interest served by the disclosure and the aims and 
objectives of the Convention”99. The Compliance Committee stressed that Aarhus Convention “does 
not define the “material in the course of completion”” therefore ““material in the course of 
completion” relates to the process of preparation of information or a document and not to an entire 
decision-making process”100. Consequentely, based on factual circumstances of alleged non-
compliance Compliance Committee confirmed that environmental information commissioned and 
approved by public administration in environmental matters of the Party concerned does not 
constitute “material in the course of completion” nor as “internal communications”, but rather as a 
final document which could and should be publicly available.”101  
The Compliance Committee confirmed that while applicable national legislation, on one hand, 
might declare as confidential working documents of meetings of public authorities, on the other 
hand the conduct, and measures adopted by public authorities as well as related information does 
not necessarily constitute confidentional information. Therefore it might be concluded that essential 
justification offered by the Party concerned for the refusal of disclosure of requested environmental 
information constituted prohibitory practice insofar in the absence of applied coherent regulatory 
framework the requested information were subject to restricted access and all relevant practices 
undertaken by public authorities were classified as confidential without considerations of the public 
interest served by the disclosure and without further justification whether the confidentiality of 
operational and internal procedures of an authority applies without distinction in every case. 
The ECJ have also established case-law dealing with substantial and procedural aspects of 
refusal of environmental information. Although in case Stichting Natuur en Milieu ECJ 
acknowleged that transposition and implementation of Article 4 of Directive 2003/4 which 
stipulates exceptions to EU Member States binding obligation for disclosure of environmental 
information allows to adopt criteria in legislation for such exceptions, the provision “also requires 
that such a ground for refusal must be interpreted in a restrictive way, taking into account the public 
interest served by disclosure, and that in every particular case the public interest served by 
disclosure must be weighed against the interest served by the refusal”102. It was also asserted that a 
criterion to take into account the public interest served by the disclosure is given broad 
interpretation which includes its applicability to obligation to disclose requested information on 
emissions into the environment.  
Likewise, it might be argued that ECJ interpretation of EU secondary law obliging to consider 
“the public interest served by the disclosure of environmental information and the specific interest 
served by a refusal to disclose”103 on case-by-case basis alongside with specific criteria on non- 
disclosure of information provided in national legislation is consistent with its case-law aiming to 
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preserve the effectiveness of the provision. As to the exception to obligation to disclose information, 
ECJ in case Križan and Others held that although relevant provisions of EU secondary law and 
Aarhus Convention allows authorities to refuse access to commercial and industrial information, the 
refusal of the authorities to provide information cannot be justified on grounds of prohibition to 
disseminate confidential, commercial or industrial information if requested information was 
necessary for effective exercise of rights of public participation in administrative proceedings of 
territorial planning
104
. 
Although ECJ in case Križan and Others noted the importance of the scope of the applicable 
exemptions of obligation to provide access to environmental information, of greater significance in 
relation to potential non-compliance with Aarhus pillar on access to information are conclusions 
made by ECJ in case Bayer CropScience and Stichting De Bijenstichting confirming that given the 
wording and aim of provisions of Directive 2003/4/EC and Aarhus Convention to grant broad 
availability and dissemination of environmental information confidentiality of commercial and 
industrial does not constitute in every case a valid ground for refusal to disseminate information 
relating to such concepts as “emissions into the environment” and “information on emissions into 
the environment”, especially when widest possible disclosure of environmental information serves 
to promote environmental awareness and environmental protection in the public.
105
 ECJ also 
clarified that in securing also legitimate aim to restrict disclosure of environmental information due 
to risks of adverse effects its disclosure might cause to confidentiality of commercial or industrial 
information or other interests under Article 4 Paragraph 2 of Directive 2003/4/EC, a competent 
authority might consider the possibility of providing partial access to the information requested 
regarding disclosure of information on emissions into the environment. 
It is reasonable to conclude that although case-law of ECJ and findings and recommendations 
of Compliance Committee are permissive to applicability of exceptions to obligation to disclose 
environmental information and allow challenges to interpret them broadly or restrictively, it is also 
worth to acknowledge that ECJ interpretative margine of manoeuvre is limited to exercise its 
competence for enabling consistent and coherent application of obligations relating to accessability 
of environmental information only during preliminary reference procedure or when requested to 
adjudicate infringement proceedings against EU Member State. Therefore Compliance Committee 
plays a pivotal role for evaluating the completeness and potential need for further improvement of 
application of environmental participatory rights. Findings and recommendations provide a more 
nuanced approach towards measures adopted for enjoyment of environmental participatory rights or 
obstacles incurred of applied prohibitory practices as well as it might be argued that in practice 
alleged non-compliance claims brought by the public before Compliance Commitee are reviewed 
and outcomes are delivered with such efficiency that compliance mechanism under Aarhus 
Convention might be compared to the effective proceedings before national judiciary. 
2.2. Public participation in environmental decision-making 
2.2.1. Scope of requirements under public participation 
Legal scholars have observed that one of major success of Aarhus Convention “is providing a 
cause of action when a state fails to comply with its own environmental laws by giving affected 
populations the rights to obtain relevant environmental information, to voice an opinion on major 
projects, and to challenge the government when it fails to live up to its obligations.”106 In additon, 
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legal scholars have asserted that as three provisons under Aarhus Convention stipulates substantial 
and procedural obligations for conduct of public participation in decision-making, its is constructed 
on “the traditional threefold distinction of public participation in specific decision-making, in plan-
and policy-making, and in legislative drafting and rule-making”107. It has also been argued that 
Article 6 requires conduct for public participation to all decision-making procedures aimed at 
granting permission to proceed with activities which may have significant environmental impact, 
therefore “[s]uch a decision relates always to the “proposed activity” to be undertaken by an 
individual or entity-such as a developer if it relates to a brand new project or operator of an existing 
installations if the decision relates to the extension of such installation”108. From the standpoint of 
the public though provisions of Article 6 constitutes grounds for claims to have access to relevant 
proposed activity related environmental information, to be informed “early in the decision-making 
procedure and in an adequate, timely and effective manner” and to have reasonable timeframes for 
preparation and participation in environmental decision-making.  
Observations of legal scholars suggests that given the similarities of threefold distinction of 
public participation in specific decision-making, plan and policy-making as well as legislative 
drafting and rule making to “ladder of public participation”109 the relevance of comprehensive 
approach to public participation in environmental decision-making under Article 6 of Aarhus 
Convention prevails over uncertain wording of provisions of Article 7 and 8 which leaves under 
discretionary power of the Parties to determine their scope of application. In addition, the concept 
of “ladder of public participation” should be interpreted as threefold public participation “in which 
members of the public are given more power when they have a specific interest in matters directly 
affecting their lives and well-being and progressively less direct power and influence as matters 
become more abstract and general”. Although such assertion might be substantiated by observation 
that provisions under Article 6 create clear legally binding obligations regarding decisions plans and 
programmes to be adopted for proposed activities but Article 7 and 8 “in fact merely require 
practical arrangements to be made without an obligation to implement them”, cases of alleged non-
compliance regarding obligations under second Aarhus pillar illustrate activism of the public to hold 
Parties accountable for correct implementation of requirements of public participation in policy-
making and public participation in rule-making. 
In regard to requirement to conduct “early public participation when all options are open” 
Compliance Committee has acknowledged discretionary power of Parties to determine range of 
subjects put forwards subsequently at each stage of decision-making in accordance with “a concept 
of tiered decision-making, whereby at each stage of decision-making certain options are discussed 
and selected with the participation of the public and each consecutive stage of decision-making 
addresses only the issues within the option already selected at the preceding stage”110. Compliance 
Commitee also held that within tiered decision-making procedures public authorities might be 
requested to adopt under Article 7 such consecutive startegic documents as policies, plans and 
programmes as well as individual decisions on proposed activities under Article 6. The development 
of Compliance Commission’s findings and recommendations on applicability of Article 6 or 7 and 
compliance with provisions on public participation reveals comprehensive and consistent approach 
to reach conclusion that in absence of clear definition which treaty provision applies to actual scope 
of alleged on-compliant public participation, it was acknowledged that applicability of Article 6 or 7 
“must be determined on a contextual basis, taking into account the legal effects of the act, while its 
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label under the domestic law of the Party concerned is not decisive”111. It is also worth to mention 
that Compliance Commitee in most cases of alleged non-compliance with requirements under 
Aarhus second pillar have established articulate and nuanced approach how to interpret applicability 
of Article 6,7 and 8 to factual circumstances of the case taking into account particularities of 
applicable law of Party concerned. Legal scholars regarding application of treaty obligation have 
observed that its effective enforcement is dependent on clear-cut and definite content
112
. The notion 
of a provision’s clear-cut and definite content is applied also by Compliane Commitee within 
interpretation of scope of application of Article 6, 7 and 8 of Aarhus Convention. It might be argued 
that Complriance Commitee applies the notion of a provision’s clear-cut and definite content for 
intepretation of obligations of Party concerned whereby through findings and recommendations it 
has been established that “the public participation requirements for decision-making on an activity 
covered by article 7 are a subset of the public participation requirements for decision-making on an 
activity covered by article 6. Regardless of whether the decisions are considered to fall under article 
6 or article 7, the requirements of paragraphs 3, 4 and 8 of article 6 apply”113. Therefore 
Compliance Committee when examining claims of non-compliance with provisions of public 
participation in environmental decision-making will apply on case-by case basis adopted treaty 
standard to factual circumstances and national legal framework of Party concerned. 
In contrast to views of legal scholars that legal relevance might be attributed to those 
provisions under Aarhus Convention which constitutes “obligations to be implemented in the form 
of binding legal provisions”114, Compliance Committe through findings and recommendations have 
pronounced on importance of legal effects which might be caused by decisions adopted in 
enviromental decision-making. Compliance Commitee in case ACCC/C/2009/43 have 
acknowledged that “it is important to identify what the legal effects of an act are — whether an act 
constitutes a decision under article 7 or a first phase/intention for a planned activity under article 6, 
because only some of the public participation provisions of article 6 apply to decisions under article 
7”115. Therefore it might be asserted that in contrary to the opinion that scope of application of 
Article 7 “merely require[s] practical arrangements”116 Compliance Commitee suggests not only 
that decisions adopted in environmental decision-making under Article 7 might cause legal effects 
but also that interpretation of Article 6 and 7 has led to clarification what treaty standard those 
provisions implies. 
With respect to public participation during preparation of executive regulations and/or 
generally applicable legally binding normative instruments Compliance Commitee have ephasized 
that compliance with Article 8 is achieved if Parties exercising their discretionary power to adopt 
practical arrangements for conduct of public participation applies three procedural participatory 
requirements
117
. Through findings and recommendations Compliance Committee has clarified that 
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“scope of obligations under article 8 relate to any normative act that may have a significant effect 
on the environment, which should be considered as including acts dealing with procedural matters 
related to authorization of activities subject to environmental assessment, as well as to public 
participation in environmental matters”118. Therefore it is important to note that Compliance 
Commitee has developped nuanced approach with an attempt to clarify the notion of effective, 
conscious and inclusive public participation under Article 8 stating that alongside application of 
three procedural participatory requirements Parties are to provide final normative act with 
explanatory document on outcomes of conduct of public participation “and how the results of the 
public participation were taken into account”119. 
2.2.2. Public participation in transboundary context 
Legal scholars have observed that current developments on application of Aarhus Convention, 
especially its Article 3 Paragraph 7, leads to assume that in matters relating to environment public 
participation in environmental decision-making its applicability expands also to international 
environmental decision-making procedures therefore causing to review scope of application of 
provisions of environmental participatory rights
120
. Regarding relevant stakeholders in 
environmental decision-making processes Compliance Committee through findings and 
recommendations has evaluated such concepts as “the public” and “the public concerned”. 
Compliance Commitee in case ACCC/C/2010/50 dealing with NGO alleged non-compliance with 
requirements of public participation of Party concerned regarding “limited scope of public 
participation to “persons, whose property rights or some other rights in rem to neighbouring land or 
structures thereon are likely to be directly affected”121, stated that distinction of “the public 
concerned” and “the public” shows that the definition of “the public concerned” is narrower than 
the latter. With regard to abovementioned and provisions of public participation in environmental 
decision-making the public concerned is identified on the basis of the criteria of “affected or likely 
to be affected by”, or “having an interest in”. Furthermore, it was presumed that scope of 
application of “the public concerned” alongside with criteria also in practice depends on 
characteristics of proposed activity subject to public participation
122
.  
In addition, it might be argued that not only Compliance Commitee explored new avenues for 
extention of applicability of the concept “the public concerned” observing that “members of the 
public have an interest in the decision-making depends on whether their property and other related 
rights (in rem rights), social rights or other rights or interests relating to the environment may be 
impaired by the proposed activity”123, but also provided interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 5 of 
Aarhus Convention stressing that “this provision of the Convention does not require an 
environmental NGO as a member of the public to prove that it has a legal interest in order to be 
considered as a member of the public concerned”124. The findings on a broad scope of application 
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of the concept “the public concerned” coincides with academic thought that “[a]lthough the Aarhus 
Convention does not specifically require non-discriminatory transboundary application, its 
provisions apply in quite general terms to the public” or the “public concerned”, without 
distinguishing between those inside the state and others beyond its borders”125.  
Having regard to aforementioned, the scope and extent of applicability afforded to provisions 
under second Aarhus pillar to trans-boundary communicants reflects Compliance Committees 
quasi-judicial activism to promote application of Aarhus Convention in international environmental 
decision-making which also implies in trans-boundary context creation of subset of environmental 
participatory rights individuals and NGOs might rely on when necessary to hold Parties concerned 
accountable for alleged failure to take due consideration of extra-territorial effects. In addition, the 
recognition of members of civil society entitlement to claim rights for effective public participation 
for proposed activities beyond borders of their origin is also in line with Compliance Commitee’s 
conclusion that “compliance review is forward-looking and that its aim is to begin facilitating 
implementation and compliance at the national level once a need for such is established”126.  
It might be argued that current use and application of compliance mechanism by indviduals 
and NGOs under Aarhus Convention has assisted to the development of comprehensive approach to 
public participation in international - decision making in advancing applicability of environmental 
participatory rights in transboundary context thus expanding cause of actions for civil society to 
challenge governmental conduct in substantial and procedural environmental matters. Article 31 
Paragraph 3(c) Article 18 of VCL stipulates obligation to interpret treaty by taking into account any 
relevant rules of international law applicable to the relations between the parties
127
. The 
International Law Commission has addressed the issue of applicability of particular provision under 
public international law in a broader context within system of international law in general by 
advising to apply “a principle of “systemic integration””128 provided in Article 31 Paragraph 3(c) 
Article 18 of the VCLT. Due to risks of expansion of divergent approaches to particular issues and 
disparities in public international law International Law Commission has clarified rationale behind 
introduction of principle of systemic integration asserting that: 
All treaty provisions receive their force and validity from general law, 
and set up rights and obligations that exist alongside rights and 
obligations established by other treaty provisions and rules of customary 
international law. None of such rights or obligations has any intrinsic 
priority against the others. The question of their relationship can only be 
approached through a process of reasoning that makes them appear as 
parts of some coherent and meaningful whole.
129
 
 
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that alongside supporters for established approach on 
how to avoid dissonant interpretations of equal issues under different regimes of international law, 
legal scholars have also criticised general applicability of systemic integration. Legal scholars have 
observed that regardless of assertion that “systemic integration should be the proces whereby 
international treaty obligations are interpreted by reference to their normative environment, so that, 
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as a consequence, treaties function as parts of a coherent and meaningful whole”130, the meaning 
and wording of Article 31 Paragraph 3(c) Article 18 of the VCLT cannot be considered equal to the 
principle itself. Likewise, it might be argued that Compliance Commitee regarding obligations of 
public participation in environmental decision-making involving two or more relevant Parties 
concerned has already provided quasi-judicial guidance on trans-boundary application of Aarhus 
Convention. Also findings and recommendations of Compliance Commitee in alleged non-
compliance with public participation in environmental decision-making in trans-boundary context 
cases reflect recourse to systemic interpretation of Aarhus Convention within systemic integration 
with other multilateral environmental legal instrument, in most cases with Espoo Convention
131
.  
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that findings and recommendations reflect systemic 
avoidance by Compliance Commitee to “interpret one treaty by reference to another treaty”132. A 
purposive and interpretive guidance on applicability of Article 6 of Aarhus Convention regarding 
claims of insuffiecient and ineffective public participation in decision – making of proposed activity 
(ultrahazardous activity) beyond borders of Party concerned reveals Compliance Committee’s 
cautious approach not to engage into research of similar or identical provision of other treaty 
subject to interpretation. Compliance Commitee in case ACCC/C/2012/71 concluded that “whether 
in a domestic or transboundary context, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the public 
participation procedure complies with the requirements of article 6 lies with the competent 
authorities of the Party of origin”133. The conclusions of Compliance Commitee in case 
ACCC/C/2013/9 exemply the development of the extent considerations are given to other treaty 
while still preserving purpose of Aarhus Convention and applying due diligences of contextual 
differences.  
Acting as an interpreter of applicability of Article 6 of Aarhus Convention to proposed 
activities which might have trans-boundary implications beyond the public of Party concerned 
Compliance Commitee has pronounced that treaty regime might provide for joint responsibility 
between affected Party and a Party of origin to reach compliance with provisions to conduct proper 
public-participation in environmental decision-making within territory of Party affected.
134
 
Nevertheless, Compliance Commitee reitered independence of obligations under Article 6 of Aarhus 
Convention from binding requirements under other multilateral environmenal treaties and 
concluded that margin of discretion of Party concerned to refrain itself from application of 
requirements of public participation in environmental decison-making in favour of other provisions 
of environmental participatory rights is not sufficient reason to limit their application, neither it 
precludes entitlement of civil society to require their extra-territorial application
135
. In addition, in 
reply of allegations that Aarhus Convention does not confer rights to be informed of extra-territorial 
proposed activity from a neigbouring country apart from transboundary environmental impact 
assessment procedure Compliance Committee reaffirmed based on its previous findings duty of 
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Party concerned to disseminate information on envisaged proceedings of public participation, 
therefore affirming non-compliance of Party concerned
136
. 
The conclusions of Compliance Committee points to a larger issue, which goes to the heart of 
the challenge: adoption of regulatory framework to oblige public authorities “when selecting means 
of notifying the public [..] would ensure that all those who potentionally could be concerned, 
including the public outside its territory, have a reasonable chance to learn about the proposed 
activity”137.  
Compliance Committee’s findings provide useful insights into the difficulties from 
application of provisions of public participation in environmental decison-making and recognition 
by recourse to Aarhus compliance-mechanism of civil society’s entitlement to rely on rights of 
public participation in trans-boundary context by. Progressive development of Compliance 
Committee’s quasi-judicial practice in interpreting applicability of provisions of public participation 
in environmental decison-making points out to three observations. Applicability of provisions of 
public participation in environmental decison-making extends to proposed activities, especially 
regarding ultrahazardous activities beyond territorial jurisdiction of Party of origin and presumably 
affected Party.  
The synergies and links between Aarhus Convention and other provisions of multilateral 
environmental treaties are welcome and are attuned to enhance wide public-participation in 
environmental decision-making beyond strict territorial scope of application, however Compliance 
Commitee while applying principle of systemic integration has followed academic thought that 
“principle of systemic integration should not be relied on as the legal tool for an unwarranted 
alignments of a treaty’s meaning with the content of other treaties.138” Despite the clear absence in 
most cases of established non-compliance by Compliance Committee of clear regulatory framework 
on conduct of public participation in environmental decision-meetings in trans-border context 
recourse to other other bodies under Aarhus Convention such as Task Force on Public Participation 
in Decision-Making
139
 and Task Force on Access to Justice
140
 for guidance and recommendations 
on alignement of application of environmental participatory rights. 
2.3. Access to justice 
2.3.1. Scope of EU’s considerations 
Procedural equity and inclusiveness are components which constitute in accordance with 
academic thought procedural justice. In broader perspective legal scholars have recognized the 
concept of environmental justice not only as a social movement but also a framework within 
implications of national and internation legal regimes affecting most vulnerable parts of civil 
society might be identified and assessed. The concept of environmental justice implies according to 
academic thought four subsets such as social justice, corrective justice, distributive justice and 
procedural justice
141
. 
The jurisprudence of CJEU and its recent developments regarding application of provisions 
under Aarhus Convention have contributed to implement in practice such subsets of environmental 
                                                 
136
 Ibid, paragraph 89. 
137
 Ibid. 
138
 Supra, note 130; p.568. 
139
 Decision EMP.II/1 of MOP to Aarhus Convention (Extraordinary session 2010). Available 
on: https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/e-mop/ece_mp_pp_2010_2_add_1_e.pdf . Accessed 6 June 2020. 
140
 Decision I/5 of First MOP to Aarhus Convention. 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.6.e.pdf . Accessed 6 June 2020. 
141
 Carmen G. Gonzalez and Sumundu Atapattu “International Environental Law, Environmental Justice, and the Global 
South”, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 26(2) (2017):p.233-234. 
31 
 
justice as procedural and corrective justice. In addition, legal scholars have asserted that procedural 
and corrective justice constitutes the concept of environmental justice to the extent as it is 
understood in the EU. Therefore, the scope of application of environmental justice refers to three 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars under Aarhus Convention whereby “access to 
information is thus a necessary prerequisite for meaningful [public] participation, while access to 
justice is a means to enforce other two [environmental participatory] rights”142. 
CJEU has developed extensive jurisprudence establishing various approaches to be followed 
by EU and its Member States to apply their national legislation and EU secondary law in 
conformity with provisions under Aarhus Convention. With regard to application to date of Article 
9 Paragraph 1 of Aarhus Convention CJEU in case East Sussex County Council was requested to 
establish whether provisions under national legal system are in compliance with Directive 
2003/4/EC. CJEU established that secondary EU law on access to information does not constitute a 
threshold to be met by Member States to ensure adequate and effective administrative and judicial 
review, therefore it concluded that it is up to margin of discretion of Member States to establish 
under national legal system the extent of administrative and judicial review in compliance with 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness
143
. Nevertheless, CJEU also stressed that compatibility 
of administrative and judicial review with EU law is established when “it enables the court or 
tribunal hearing an application for annulment of such a decision to apply effectively the relevant 
principles and rules of EU law when reviewing the lawfulness of the decision”144. Academic 
thought asserts that Article 9 Paragraph 1 and 2 stipulates “availability of administrative and 
judicial remedies designed to enforce the rights granted to the public under the passive access to 
information provisions (Article 4) and the provisions relating to pubic participation in decision on 
specific activities (Article 6) [Aarhus Convention]”145. Therefore, considering CJEU conclusions 
and assertions of academia EU Member State should be aware that exercise of margin of disrection 
regarding adoption of legal framework on access to justice is subject to stringent requirements 
derived from applicable EU law. 
With regard to scope of application of Member State’s margin of discretion concerning access 
to justice in environmental matters, CJEU in case Gruber observed that given almost identical 
wording of the proper provision under EU secondary law and Article 9 Paragraph 2 of Aarhus 
Convention admissibility of cause of action falls under two conditions
146
. CJEU clarified that 
“admissibility of an action may be conditional either on the existence of ‘a sufficient interest in 
bringing the action’, or on the applicant alleging ‘the impairment of a right’, depending on which of 
those conditions is adopted in the national legislation”147. In conclusion it was established that 
although Member States have a significant discretion to determine what constitutes ‘sufficient 
interest’ or ‘impairment of a right, nevertheless they are under obligation to promote and enhance 
wide access to judicial review of the public concerned
148
.  
CJEU has drawn interpretive guidance to judiciary of EU Member States on applicability of 
provisions of third pillar under Aarhus recognizing rights of NGOs access to justice. In case 
Djurgården summarized preliminary question before CJEU was whether a NGO which promotes 
environmental protection can have access to a review procedure to challenge disputed decision if it 
does not satisfy requirements under national law establishing a concrete threshold of participant’s 
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number giving access to judicial review
149
. It is worth to note that CJEU partially followed 
Advocate General Sharpston line of reasoning whereby CJEU concluded that applicable relevant 
EU secondary law and regulatory framework on structure of judicial institutions of a Member State 
and their competences does not justify NGOs binding restrictions on access to review procedure
150
. 
The position of Advocate General Sharpston, in contrast to CJEU observations, was based on 
articulated analysis stating that although relevant provision under EU secondary law does not grant 
access to justice without restrictions, given NGOs promoting environmental protection “special 
supervisory role”151 once they are in compliance with requirements of the concept of public 
concerned, it should have directly applicable access to justice. The conclusions of Advocate 
General Sharpston coincides of the academic assertion that “[t]he Convention also goes some way 
towards establishing general legal standing for environmental NGOs inasmuch as it essentially 
requires States to recognize that the purposes of an organization as stated in its charter or statuete 
may establish a sufficient and recognizable legal interest”152. 
In addition, CJEU in the latter case also pronounced on the exercise of environmental 
participatory rights stating that “participation in decision-making procedure has no effect on the 
conditions for access to the review procedure”153 due to different purposes and also arguably 
different level of finality of proceedings. Likewise, CJEU in case Trianel observed that provisions 
under national legal system of EU Member State with regards to access to justice should be subject 
of alignment with the objectives of Aarhus Convention and should achieve the aim to grant the 
public concerned wide access to justice
154
. In addition, CJEU stressed that although legislator of EU 
Member State has a margin of discretion to determine scope of the the concept of impairment of a 
right, it cannot be derived from “conditions which only other physical or legal persons can fulfil, 
such as the condition of being a more or less close neighbour of an installation or of suffering in one 
way or another the effects of the installation’s operation”155. Therefore, CJEU concluded that 
incompatible with relevant provisions under EU secondary law which refer to decision-making 
procedures of projects which might with a high probability affect state of the environment are 
national provisions which preclude environmental protection organisations access to justice. Similar 
considerations related to recognition of legal standing for environmental NGOs and their access to 
justice were adressed by academic thought asserting that “the Convention states that environmental 
NGOs meeting the requirements of national law shall be deemed to have rights capable of being 
impaired, or sufficient legal interest in order to challenge the procedural and substantive legality of 
decision on specific activities.
156”  
In absence of relevant EU secondary law relating to access to justice in environmental matters 
ECJ readiness and preparadness to recognize direct effect of Article 9 Paragraph 3 of Aarhus 
Convention was tested in so-called Slovak Bears case
157
. Legal scholars have asserted that 
“[t]hrough its case-law, the Court has partly filled the gap left by the absence of EU legislation 
concerning Member States obligations under Article 9(3) of the Convention”158. CJEU were 
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requested to provide interpretive guidance whether in absence of provisions relating to access to 
judicial review under EU secondary law on conservation on proteced plant and animal species 
Article 9 Paragraph 3 of Aarhus Convention is directly applicable. CJEU replied in negative stating 
that based on established case-law relating to requirements which should be complied in order to 
establish direct applicability of bindings provisions under international law “Article 9(3) of the 
Aarhus Convention do not contain any clear and precise obligation capable of directly regulating 
the legal position of individuals.”159 In additon, CJEU noted that broad wording of Article 9 
Paragraph 3 aims at ensuring effective environmental protection therefore lagislator of Member 
States is mandated to adopt regulatory framework containing precise conditions how individuals 
might exercise their environmental participatory rights. However, CJEU also asserted that Mamber 
States’ margin of discretion relating to constitution of regulatory framework on access to justice 
must comply with the principle of equivalence and the principle of effectiveness “so as to enable an 
environmental protection organisation [..] to challenge before a court a decision taken following 
administrative proceedings liable to be contrary to EU environmental law.” Legal scholars have 
drawn conclusions from the latter case noting that provisions under Aarhus Convention are a 
benchmark and arguably standard for application of principle of effective judicial protection
160
.  
Negation of “effective judicial protection of the rights conferred by EU environmental law”161 
occurs when national legislation relating to locus standi of individuals including environmental 
NGOs does not “meet the objectives pursued by Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.162”, 
therefore “the principle of effective judicial protection and Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention 
are in a mutually reinforcing relationship.
163” However, despite judicial-inspired academic thought 
that CJEU conclusions in Slovak Bears case aspires in absence of EU secondary law on access to 
justice to assist presumably environmental NGOs to obtain wider access to justice before judicial 
institutions of EU Member States, question whether CJEU has properly adressed the issue of locus 
standi of enviromental NGOs remains. It is worth mentioning that approach adopted by CJEU to 
refer rather to such ambiguous criterion as “to the fullest extent possible”164 than to provide 
reffering national court with instructive guidance on how Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention 
should be incorporated into national legal system with conformity of EU law derived principle of 
effective judicial protection, rises questions on Member States’ margin of discretion in good faith 
and in conformity with objectives of Aarhus Convention to adopt relevant legislation. Nevertheless, 
EU Member States’s margin of discretion to implement third pillar under Aarhus Convention into 
their national legal system might enhance environmental NGOs recourse to such a treaty-based 
compliance mechanism as Aarhus. Considering incapacity of environmental NGOs to initiate 
preliminary proceedings before CJEU regarding review of Member State’s regulatory framework 
non-compliance with provisions relating to access to justice, access to Compliance Commitee equal 
as to the Parties is the most appropriate international fora allowing not only to enhance awareness of 
particular issue of implementation, application or exercise of environmental participatory rights at 
international level but also implying inclusion of environmental NGOs into law-makings 
procedures in transboundary context. 
Scope of judicial review and legal standing for individuals to challenge EU legal acts before 
EU judicial institutions is provided in Article 263 Paragraph 4 TFEU which stipulates standing of 
natural and legal persons to submit a claim for annulment of a “regulatory act which is of direct 
                                                 
159
 Supra, note 49; paragraph 45. 
160
 Koen Lenaerts and Jose A. Gutierrrez-Fons “To say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and the 
European Court of Justice”, Columbia Journal of European Law, 20(2) (2014):p.43. 
161
 Ibid. 
162
 Ibid. 
163
 Ibid.; p.44. 
164
 Supra, note 49; paragraph 50. 
34 
 
concern to them and does not entail implmenting measures”165. CJEU in case Inuit upheld ruling of 
the General Court and clarified that in accordance of Article 263 Paragraph 4 TFEU regulatory acts 
are constituted by acts of general application which are other than legislative acts, therefore it might 
be argued that CJEU agreed to findings of General Court stating that act in issue was a legislative 
act and it also implied for litigants in case seeking its annulment to prove that they are directly and 
individually concerned
166
. From environmental perspective and relating to environmental 
participatory rights CJEU in case Vereniging Milieudefensie set aside ruling of General Court 
concluding that annulment of EU secondary law might be substantiated by provisions of an 
international agreement if meaning of international agreement does not preclude such a conduct and 
if provisions under international agreement are “unconditional and sufficiently precise”167.  
Furthermore, CJEU in line with reasoning in Slovak Bears case concluded that in the absence 
of “unconditional and sufficiently precise obligation capable of directly regulating the legal position 
of individuals” and since Article 9 Paragraph 3 of Aarhus Convention is subject to implementing 
measures, it cannot constitute a legal ground “to be properly relied on before EU judicature for the 
purposes of assessing the legality of Article 10(1) of Regulation No1367/2006”168. It is worth to 
note that although Articles 10 and 11 of the Aarhus Regulation provide for access to the 
administrative review procedure for NGOs, a submission for administrative review might be 
inadmissible if the submission does not comply with requirements of, for instance individual scope, 
legally binding and external effects, environmental law provided in Article 2 Paragraph 1 (f)(g) and 
Article 2 Paragraph 2
169
. Legal scholars and Compliance Committe under Aarhus Convention have 
expressed concerns regarding compatibility of “reduced circle of beneficiaries”170 under Article 11 
of Aarhus Regulation with Article 9 Paragraph 3 of Aarhus Convention. Although Article 9 
Paragraph 3 of Aarhus Convention stipulates margin of discretion of Parties to establish civil 
society binding criteria for access to justice, restricted scope of application of Article 11 under 
Aarhus Regulation relating only to NGOs asserts its non-compliance with Aarhus Convention. 
From the cases discussed, it follows that state practice of EU Member States and well-
established case-law of CJEU leads towards establishing comprehensive approach on recognition 
and implementation of broad access to justice including conferral of participatory rights to members 
of the public to have opportunity to challenge procedural and substantive legality of decision on 
specific activities as well ommissions. Nevertheless, reluctance of the EU institutions exercising 
their competence to resolve encountered divergencies of application of provisions under Aarhus 
Convention and relevant EU law circumvents implementation of the treaty obligations and arguably 
creates adverse effects on promotion of environmental justice, especially on procedural justice 
beyond the EU. 
2.3.2. Scope of considerations by Compliance Committee 
Legal scholars have asserted that “the Convention allows a great deal of flexibility in defining 
which members of the public have access to justice”171. Compliance Committee in case 
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ACCC/C/2008/31 and ACCC/C/2005/11 clarified that application of Article 9 Paragraph 3 of 
Aarhus Convention should be examined in Articles 1 to 3 of the Convention, therefore granting any 
member of the public wide access to justice and asserting that application of Article 9 Paragraph 3 
implies presumption that civil society has access to review procdures provided in national law in 
order to challenge acts and ommissions violating environmental law
172
. In addition, it was also 
established that: 
On the one hand, the Parties are not obliged to establish a system of popular action 
(“actio popularis”) in their national laws with the effect that anyone can challenge 
any decision, act or omission relating to the environment. On other the hand, the 
Parties may not take the clause “where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its 
national law” as an excuse for introducing or maintaining so strict criteria that they 
effectively bar all or almost all environmental organizations from challenging act or 
omissions that contravene national law. 
In the context of CJEU ruling in Slovak Bears case stating that judicial institutions of Member 
States have a margin of discretion regarding implementation of EU environmental law therefore 
they are competent to interpret national law “to the fullest extent possible”173 with requirements 
under Article 9 Paragraph 9 of Aarhus Convention, through findings and recommendations in the 
latter cases Compliance Committee provided clarification what should be understood by the highest 
threshold Parties could strive to achieve in implementing relevant provision. 
The second sentence of Article 9 Paragraph 1 of Aarhus Convention stipulates that if the 
review under the first sentence of Article 9 Paragraph 1 is provided by a court of law, the 
unsuccessful applicant shall also have access to an expeditious procedure for “reconsidering by a 
public authority” or “review by an independent and impartial body other than a court of law”174. 
Compliance Committee in case ACCC/C/2013/93 relating to question whether such public authority 
as Parliamentary Ombudsmen vested with rights under national law to pronounce on conduct of 
public administration constitutes a competent authority to review refusal of public administration to 
disclose information. Compliance Committee in its findings replied in affirmative and concluded 
that “under the legal framework of the Party concerned, the Parliamentary Ombudsman is an 
inexpensive, independent and impartial body established by law through which members of the 
public can request review of an information request made under article 4 of the Convention.
175”. It 
is worth to note that although Paliamentary Ombudsman issues unbinding recommendations to 
addressees they are mostly followed by public administration of the Party concerned therefore it 
might be asserted that the institution of the Ombudsmen constitutes a review mechanism under 
Article 9 Paragraph 1 of Aarhus Convention.  
It might be reasonably asserted that due to recent developments of quasi-judicial practice of 
Compliance Committee regarding application of Article 9 Paragraph 1 it suffices for the Parties to 
have a system whereby the decision of information holding authority on refusal to disclose 
environmental information is reconsidered within the relevant public administration. 
 
Civil society recourse to compliance mechanism under Aarhus Convention has initiated 
interlinkages between practice of Compliance Committee and CJEU jurisprudence. The 
interlinkages which also have implicitly triggered implications on implementation of provisions 
under Aarhus Convention by EU and its Member States have by integrated approach been reflected 
in findings and recommendations of Compliance Committee. In case ACCC/C/2008/31 the 
communicant requested Compliance Committee to establish the Party’s legal system’s non-
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compliance with Article 9 Paragraph 2 and 3 as well as with Article 9 Parapgraph 3 in conjunction 
with Article 9 Paragraph 4 whereby established criteria for standing for environmental NGOs are 
undully stringent; members of the public are deprieved from procedural rights to challenge legality 
of any decision subject of Article 6. It was also alleged that national legislation does not provide for 
environmental NGOs which does not fulfill criterion of impairment of rights competence to 
challenge acts and omissions of private persons and public authorities
176
. Compliance Commitee in 
reply of communicant’s claim of identified deficiences of improper incorporation into national legal 
system and inccorect application separately and cumulatively of Article 9 Paragraph 2, 3 and 4 of 
Aarhus Convention observed that it “pays attention to the general picture regarding access to justice 
in the Party concerned”177 and “[t]he “general picture” includes both the legislative framework of 
the Party concerned concerning access to justice in environmental matters, and its application in 
practice by the courts”178 therefore “the Committee does not only examine whether the Party 
concerned has literally transposed the wording of the Convention into national legislation, but also 
considers practice, as shown through relevant case law”179. It was also clarified that possibility that 
judicial institutions of the Party concerned may apply national provisons incompatible with 
requirements under Aarhus Convention on standing of environmental NGOs and their access to 
judicial review procedures without presentation of appropriate evidence to substantiate such 
allegations does not constitute sufficient grounds to identify Party’s non-compliance180. Although 
Compliance Committee did not develop in-depth considerations on legal relevance of conclusions 
of CJEU in case Trianel, Compliance Commitee adopted purposive approach to articulate its legal 
reasoning with assertions of CJEU avoiding unwarranted alignment of its applied quasi-judicial 
practice with case-law of EU judiciary. 
In addition communicant’s allegations of non-compliance of restrictions under national law 
on standing to challenge acts and omissions of private persons and public authorities in breach of 
environmental law granted only to the restricted scope of persons exemplifies Compliance 
Committees considerations to use CJEU jurisprudence as interpetive reference in its findings. 
Compliance Committee in reply of alleged non-compliance of the Party concerned with article 9, 
paragraph 3, in conjunction with paragraph 4, of the Convention observed that given the 
particularities of applicable national law  
access to justice is granted on the basis of whether the applicant claims infringement 
of his/her subjective rights. A strict application of this principle in matters of access 
to justice under the Convention would imply non-compliance with article 9, 
paragraph 3, of the Convention, since many contraventions by public authorities and 
private persons would not be challengeable unless it could be proven that the 
contravention infringes a subjective right. The requirement of infringement of 
subjective rights would in many cases rule out the opportunity for environmental 
NGOs to access review procedures, since they engage in public interest litigation.
181
 
Furthermore, Compliance Committee considering recent amendments to applicable national 
law following CJEU ruling in Slovak Bears case reasonably assumed based that broad interpretation 
on standing of environmental NGOs to access review procedures subject to the criterion of 
impairment of a right might be due to mandatory requirement to comply with EU law. Compliance 
Commitee regarding adopted legislative measures and jurisprudence of national judiciary aiming to 
implement relevant EU law also emphasized that “[it]does not imply that the same interpretation 
will be applied by the courts to those areas of national law relevant to the Aarhus Convention but 
not covered by EU law. Nor does it guarantee that this interpretation will be widely followed in 
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future decisions”182. Therefore not convinced with assertions of the Party concerned that in the 
matters relating to nature conservation NGOs have access to review procedures without requirement 
of infringement of subjective rights under amended national law which have been affirmed by 
subsequent jurisprudence of the court of justice, Compliance Committee concluded that it is 
necessary for Party concerned to adopt relevant legislative measures to ensure standing to 
environmental NGOs to access to review procedures.  
From the cases discussed it follows that through findings and recommendations Compliance 
Commitee have adopted comprehensive and flexible approach of implementation and application of 
Article 9 of Aarhus Convention whereby Parties ensures that “effective judicial mechanisms should 
be accessible to the public, including organizations, so that its legitimate interests are protected and 
the law is enforced”183. In contrast, recent developments under Aarhus compliance-mechanism 
exemplies Compliance Committees practice to put the Party concerned under stringent scrutiny 
whenever scope of allegations of non-compliance extends to access to effective judicial protection 
for infringement of procedural rights under Article 6 of Aarhus Convention. Lastly, it might also be 
argued that latter compliance-case to certain extent might refer to communicant’s attempt to have 
recourse to Aarhus compliance-mechanism with an aim to measure possibility of introduction of 
concept of actio popularis into legal system of the Party concerned. Nevertheless, despite of 
findings of inconsistent national legal framework relating to environmental NGOs standing and 
access to judicial review, divergent practice of Party’s judiciary and disputed allegations of the 
Party concerned of direct applicability of Article 9 Paragraph 2, Compliance Committee’s 
interpretation of Article 9 articulating treaty objectives serves as the standard for assesing any Party 
obligations under Aarhus Convention. 
3. Reflection on Compliance Case ACCC/C/2008/32 concerning EU and its Impact 
on Compliance Mechanism under Aarhus Convention 
3.1. Legal appraisal of EU standing before Compliance Committee 
Compliance Committee has recently examined the application of alleged non-compliance of 
the Party concerned obligation under Article 7 of Aarhus Convention in the absence of “a 
regulatory framework that would comprehensively regulate public participation in relation to all 
plans and programmes relating to the environment prepared in its member States”184. Although 
Compliance Committee given its mandate avoided to examine whether “the provisions of the SEA 
Directive comprehensively implement all the procedural obligations contained in article 7 of the 
Convention or whether the Party’s legal framework to implement article 7 of the Convention covers 
all plans and programmes relating to the environment envisaged by its law”185, the Party’s 
concerned non-compliance with Article 7 was not affirmed. Compliance Committee by conducting 
comprehensive assessment of circumstances and taking account on arguments of legal relevance 
advanced by EU Member State as observer Party to the proceedings concluded that in the absence 
of relevant EU legislation on particular subset of plans of programmes subject to regulation under 
national law of EU Member state “Party concerned has no obligations to make appropriate practical 
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and/or other provisions for the public to to participate during the preparation of such plans and 
programmes”186.  
It might be argued that efficient implementation of EU environmental law mostly refers to 
European Commission manadate to initiate in accordance with Article 258 infringement 
proceedings against EU Member States for failure to comply with EU environmental statutory 
obligations and to preliminary reference procedure before CJEU provided in Article 267 TFEU. 
Nevertheless, regarding efficiency of infringement proceedings founded doubts persists as to their 
relevance to promote enforcement of environmental participatory rights enshrined in Aarhus 
Convention as well as their procedural and resource-related constraints to rectify identified deficient 
application and implementation of EU in the short run. Although legal scholars have asserted that as 
the system of preliminary rulings constitute the cornerstone of EU legal order, the recourse to it by 
judiciary of EU Member States in order to secure consistent interpretation of EU law implies also a 
preclusion of civil society including environmental NGOs to challenge directly acts of EU law and 
omissions before courts of justice of EU Member States. Recourse to preliminary ruling procedure 
before CJEU for individuals and environmental NGOs in pursue of annulment in some EU Member 
states is one possible and practicable avenue to challenge implementing measure of EU law before 
national court of justice thus requesting national court to submit a preliminary reference before 
CJEU.
187
 Although it have been acknowleged that recourse to CJEU for requests for preliminary 
rulings is a positive development in general for “ensuring in particular member state compliance 
with the Convention and the EU secondary legislation implementing the Convention into EU 
law”188, concerns regarding environmental NGOs access to administrative and judicial review 
before EU institutions are well-founded. Through findings and recommendations of Compliance 
Committee it has been established that allegations of EU non-respect and non-compliance with 
provisions of third Aarhus pillars concerning environmental NGOs standing requirements and 
access to independent legal review of acts and omissions are well-founded and bears legal 
relevance. 
Although it was not cotentested by the communicant (environmental NGO) and the Party 
concerned in case ACCC/C/2008/32 (I) and case ACCC/C/2008/32 (II) that structure of Aarhus 
Convention assumes procedural equality of civil society and Parties under Aarhus compliance 
mechanism, the major issue is still the scope and extent of EU binding commitments and 
performance of implementation of third Aarhus pillar. Legal scholars have observed that measuring 
compliance of international economic organization is subject also to assessment whether provisions 
under VCL, especially Article 26 which stipulates implemention of obligation under international 
treaty in good faith
189
, applies given the EU unclear statuss and self-declared autonomous legal 
order.
190
 Nevertheless, Compliance Committee clarified adherence of the EU to commitments of 
Aarhus Convention in case CCC/C/2014/124 acknowledging regional economic integration 
organization status of EU and conferral of rights under Article 17 of Aarhus Convention
191
. In 
addition Compliance Committee emphasized that EU in compliance with Article 19 Paragraph 5 
upon accession to Aarhus Convention had submitted a declaration assuming obligations to the 
extent that if “it has European Union law in force; member States remain responsible for the 
implementation of obligations that are not covered by European Union law in force”192. With regard 
to access to judicial review it is also worth mentioning that Compliance Committee in case 
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ACCC/C/2006/18 observed “that, in different ways European Community legislation does 
constitute a part of national law of the EU member states. It also notes that article 9, paragraph 3, 
applies to the European Community as a Party, and that the reference to “national law” therefore 
should be understood as the domestic law of the Party concerned.
193” Academic thought has 
asserted high importance of the latter findings concluding “that the EU is not only a Party to the 
Convention but that its legal system is comparable to that of a state and that it should therefore 
comply with treaty obligations in a similar manner
194.” Therefore, it might be concluded that 
regarding contextual obligations of international law, namely under Aarhus Convention and 
autonomous legal order of EU Compliance Committee have clarified the extent to which 
admissibility and legal relevance of submitted communications of alleged non-compliance might be 
granted. 
3.2. Tackling EU’s non-compliance with legislative or non-legislative measures 
Compliance Committee at its twenty-second meeting (17–19 December 2008) adopted a 
decision on admissibility of communicant’s (environmental NGO) submission claiming EU (the 
Party concerned) allegations of non-compliance of EU with Article 9 Paragraph 3 of Aarhus 
Convention refering to issue of Article 10 Paragraph 1 of Aarhus Regulation compatibility with the 
latter treaty provision which were substantiated by references of CJEU case-law.
195
 In reply to 
communicant’s allegations based on ECJ interpretation of NGOs binding such standing criterion as 
“individual concern” established by ruling in case Plaumann196 that the latter as applied by EU 
institutions restricts access to administrative and judicial review of individuals and environmental 
NGOs, the Party concerned asserted that access to justice of individuals and environmental NGOs is 
not restricted and implementing legislation, namely Aarhus Regulation, ensures access to 
administrative and judicial review of EU institutions for environmental NGOs.
197
 Compliance 
Committee however established with regard to application of Article 9 to acts and omissions by 
European Union institutions that 
according to the ECJ, the legal situation of the person must be affected because of a 
factual situation that differentiates him or her from all other persons. Thus, persons 
cannot be individually concerned if the decision or regulation takes effect by virtue 
of an objective legal or factual situation. The consequences of applying the 
Plaumann test to environmental and health issues is that in effect no member of the 
public is ever able to challenge a decision or a regulation in such case before the 
ECJ.
198
 
 
In contrast to strong position of application of CJEU jurisprudence regarding standing and 
access to review procedures of civil society and refraining to pronounce on compatibility of 
provisions of Aarhus Reguation with requirements of access to justice, Compliance Committee did 
not established non-compliance of the EU. Nevertheless, due to approach of Compliance 
Committee to conduct assessment of circumstances of alleged non-compliance separately in two 
distinct sets, communicant’s assertions of CJEU avoidance to pronounce on incompatibility of 
Article 10 Paragraph 1 of the Aarhus Regulation with Article 9 Paragraph 3 of Aarhus Convention 
were analyzed in findings and recommendations of case ACCC/C/2008/32 (II).  
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In response to communicant’s four majour allegations of Article 2 of Aarhus Regulation non-
compliance with Article 9 Paragraph 3 of Aarhus Convention
199
, Compliance Committee identified 
legal irrelevance of mandatory requirements under Article 10 Paragraph 1 and Article 2 Paragraph 
1(g) and incompatibility with provisions of access to justice. With regard to extension of scope of 
application to acts not adopted under environmental law, Compliance Committee concluded that 
requirement for issued act subject to administrative review before EU institutions to be 
administrative act adopted under environmental law narrows significatly down meaning of Article 9 
Paragraph 3 of Aarhus Convention which requires its broad application to all acts and omissions of 
EU institutions.
200
 With respect to extension of scope of application to acts not having legally 
binding and external effects, Compliance Committee observed that recourse to administrative 
review before EU institutions granted only to administrative acts and omissions to adopt them 
constitutes infringement of Article 9 Paragraph 3 of Aarhus Convention.
201
 In addition, Compliance 
Committee suggested that on the whole without substantial evidence from jurisprudence of national 
judiciary of EU Member States on incurred inconsistencies of interpretation and application of 
Article 12 in conjuction with Article 10 Paragraph 1, 2 and 3 of Aarhus Convention administrative 
review mechanism provided in Article 10 by reasonable assumption is fair and equitable.
202
 
Considering conclusions of Compliance Committee that given margin of discretion of EU to 
adopt legislative measures implementing Aarhus Convention and aligning provisions of EU legal 
order with treaty provisions applied jurisprudence of CJEU and Aarhus Regulation constitutes 
impediment to exercise conferred rights of civil society to access to administrative and judicial 
review, the identified issue is on the scope of possible legislative and non-legislative measures EU 
should adopt to meet requirements under Article 9 Paragraph 3.
203
 
European Commission currently has identified and presented to EU Member States three 
avenues to be possibly explored in response to identified non-compliance of EU legal order. With 
respect of legal relevance on proposed five policy option on how to address identified EU non-
compliance with Article 9 Paragraph 3 EU Member States are invited to reflect on adoption of 
legislative or non-legislative or conjoint legislative and non-legislative measures to reach 
compliance with provisions of access to justice in environmental matters.
204
 EU Member States to 
date are informally as preliminary positon to be adopted formally by governments expressed 
support for proposition to adopt at EU level legislative measures or with a greater flexibility 
combined legislative and non-legislative measures. In addition, common undersanding reached 
currently among European Commission and Member States is that legislative measures implying 
amendments to Article 267 and Article 263 Paragraph 4 of TFEU due to lack of political 
willingness would most probable not provide expected outcomes. With respect to recourse for 
amendments of secondary EU law relating to environmental participatory rights EU Member states 
have duly noticed environmental NGOs concerns that “[i]n the absence of a change of jurisprudence 
[of CJEU] in the interpretation of the standing requirements of Article 263 TFEU, environmental 
organisations /NGOs call for the Aarhus Regulation to be amended in order to broaden its scope and 
admissibility requirements. In particular, [..] the requirements of ´individual scope´ and ´external 
effects´ be eliminated and that instead of acts adopted ´under environmental law´ reference be made 
to acts which `contravene environmental law´.205” 
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In support to initiate discussion at EU level to tackle identified EU non-compliance with 
provisions of Aarhus Convention by adoption of additional legislative implementing measures 
amending relevant EU secondary law, it is also worth to note that already within CJEU unbinding, 
however respected guidance on scope of margin of discretion of Party’s to Aarhus Convention to 
conduct review of legality has been provided. Advocate General Jääskinen in his opinon in case 
Vereniging Milieudefensie observed that given the broad wording Article 9 which equally provides 
itself detailed procedural provisions and also enables margin of discretion to adopt regulatory 
framework for implemention of the objectives provided in Article 1 of Aarhus Convention it leads 
to assert mixed nature of Article 9 Paragraph 3. Furthermore, it was reasonably assumed that 
serving geater purpose to avoid occurence of area free from any judicial review the lack of direct 
effect of a treaty provision should not restrict examination of EU act with reference to provisions of 
the treaty unless the latter precludes it.
206
 In addition, it was affirmed that treaty provision itself 
might be unconditional and precise subject to broad discretion of the Parties for its implementation, 
therefore due to its precision and unconditionality it might be applied for review of legality. 
207
Although Advocate General Jääskinen concluded that provision of Article 9 Paragraph 3 
stipulates requirements to adopt implementing legislation therefore implying lack of direct effect for 
individuals to rely on it, Parties are bound to comply with such clearly identified obligation as to 
grant access to justice.
208
Lastly, it is worth to mention that with regard to interpretation of Aarhus 
Regulation academic thought has asserted that “having regard to its objective and its broad logic, 
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention is in part a sufficiently clear rule that is capable of serving as 
the basis of a legality review of the Aarhus Regulation.”209 
Having regard to aforementioned the main reasons to advocate legislative measures as 
appropriate response to findings and recommendations of Compliance Commitee in case 
ACCC/C/2008/32 are identified wide spectrum of politically and institutionally grounded 
challenges EU institutions and EU Member States are reluctant to acknowledge. Since there is not 
general agreement among European Commisson and EU Member States on amendments of EU 
primary law and without adopted common position whether and to what extent inclusion of CJEU 
into interinstitutional dialogue would be beneficial to secure EU compliance with provisions of 
Aarhus Convention introduction of amendments to Aarhus Regulation constitutes the most 
appropriate response for further consideration of EU legislator. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
The current thesis has attempted to consider whether compliance mechanism under Aarhus 
Convention serves for effective enforcement of international environmental law. In this regard, 
quasi-judicial practice of Compliance Committee was analysed and compared with established case 
law of CJEU, considering legal framework of environmental procedural rights enshrined in Aarhus 
Convention and briefly discussing relevance of historical background of international 
environmental law as well as relevance of advanced theories by legal on Party’s compliance with 
binding obligations under multilateral environmental agreements. 
As could be observed in Chapter 1 conjointly with Chapter 2 systematic recourse to 
compliance mechanism under Aarhus Convention by civil society including especially 
environmental NGOs has contributed to the development of quasi-judicial practice on 
environmental participatory righs which by general consent of the Parties in most cases is perceived 
as equal to jurisprudence of the court of justice of the Party concerned. Detailed overview of 
findings and recommendations of Compliance Committee suggests its proactive and also careful 
approach to explore new avenues of applicability environmental participatory rights in accordance 
with objectives under Aarhus Convention for greater inclusiveness of civil society in decision-
making and implicitly law-making beyond territorial and jurisdictional borders of the Parties. In 
contrast, analysis of jurisprudence of CJEU on applicability of international agreements and scope 
of conferral of rights under EU legal system to any individual including environmental NGOs 
suggests CJEU reluctance to acknowledge systemic issues on the compatibility of autonomous EU 
legal order with implementation and application of obligations under Aarhus Convention. 
Accordingly, good practices developed by Compliance Committee on implementation and 
application of “three Aarhus pillars” were analysed and assertion can be made that, for instance 
CJEU jurisprudence in access to administrative and judicial review regarding submissions by civil 
society seeking for annulment of acts and omissions of EU institutions, are nearly impossible to 
reconcile with the requirements for effective and timely judicial protection in environmental cases. 
Chapter 3 concluded discussion by considering implications findings recommendations of 
Compliance Committee in case ACCC/C/2008/32pending for approval supposedly in next MOP 
regarding EU non-compliance with Article 9 Paragraph 3 and 4 of Article. The chapter briefly 
discussed circumstances of the case and main allegations of the communicant as well as findings of 
the Compliance Committee. Finally, the analysis on possible legislative measures in response to 
non-compliance by EU was presented to conclude that due to various challenges EU instititions and 
EU Member States are faced the ammendments of Aarhus Regulation would be the most 
appropriate measure to ensure EU compliance with provisions on access to justice. 
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